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Introduction 
As the sun rose over the town of Dunkeld on the morning of August 21, 1689, 
soldiers arose from their billets and prepared for an impending fight. Forming up on the 
outskirts of town were several thousand Highland clansmen who had defeated a 
Williamite army less than a month earlier. Although their leader, John Graham of 
Claverhouse, 1st Viscount Dundee, had been killed in that battle at the pass of 
Killiecrankie, they hoped to claim another victory for the cause of their deposed 
monarch, King James VII and II. Armed with Lochaber axes, broadswords and a few 
matchlock muskets, the ferocious charges of Highland clansmen had always driven their 
Lowland foes from the field.1 They expected the same results that day at Dunkeld. 
 Opposing the Highlanders were just under 800 men from a regiment recently 
raised by the teenaged Earl of Angus. Recruited from the southwest of Scotland, these 
men belonged to a Presbyterian sect known as the Society People or, more commonly, 
the Cameronians (a moniker adopted by the regiment as well). These fanatically pious 
men had broken off from the mainstream Presbyterian Church, or Kirk, in the years 
following the Restoration. While most followers of the National Covenant had supported 
the monarchy and wanted a church that existed alongside a strong pro-Presbyterian 
government, the Cameronians furiously resisted the un-covenanted Charles II, his 
government, and the bishops placed over them in the Restoration settlements of 1660. 
They wanted a church free from any attachment to the government, so they considered 
that which existed in the days of the apostles. They protested the aggrandizement of the 
                                                 
1
 Stuart Reid, I Met the Devil & Dundee: The Battle of Killiecrankie 1689 (Newthorpe, Nottingham: 
Partizan Press, 2009), 58. 
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Episcopalian Church by conducting illegal outdoor worship services called conventicles.2 
As a result of this illicit activity, Charles II and James, then Duke of York and ruler of 
Scotland for his brother, unleashed the total might of their regular army and thousands of 
loyal Highlanders (the second, infamous “Highland Host”) on the zealots of the Western 
Lowlands.3 This result was an era remembered in Scotland as “the Killing Time,” a 
period unrestrained violence and executions against radical Dissenters by Episcopalians 
committed to the Stuart monarchy’s control of Scotland.4 Though the Cameronians 
resisted bravely, countless men, women and children were slain in those attacks, most 
notably the group’s leader, Richard Cameron, killed by English dragoons under the 
command of the Claverhouse himself. Even with their sect severely weakened, the 
Cameronians continued to worship and pray that a new settlement could be reached in 
Scotland that would conform to their religious ideas.  
When the Glorious Revolution came to Scotland in 1689, the predominately 
Lowland and Presbyterian Convention of Estates voted to follow the instructions sent 
from William over those sent from James. This action resulted in the flight of the few 
Jacobites who had come to Edinburgh. Once the opposition had been purged from the 
assembly, the Convention went about preparing for its own defense from an inevitable 
Jacobite attack. Angus was authorized to raise a regiment of the radicals in the south-west 
of the kingdom, who were willing to face their old foes in battle once again, thus reviving 
the military struggle between Presbyterians and Episcopalians within the context of 
Scotland’s new war. The Cameronians’ commitment to defeating the Jacobites was so 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 8-9. 
3
 John L. Roberts, Clan, King and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the 
Glencoe Massacre (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 153. 
4
 Ibid., 163 
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strong that General Hugh MacKay, King William’s commander-in-chief in Scotland, 
wrote that they were, “of all the kingdom, the most zealous for their Majesties’ 
government and the Protestant interest.”5 MacKay’s word choice is interesting, however, 
as the combatants on both sides, unlike those fighting for William and James in Ireland, 
viewed themselves as Protestant. The Highland War, as history has remembered the 
military element of Scotland’s Revolution, was not a stand by Protestants against 
Catholic ambitions; it was a war to define just what Scottish Protestantism meant. Both 
denominations had held, and lost, control of Scotland’s church throughout the 
seventeenth century. The new war saw the Kirk hang in the balance yet again, as both 
Jacobites and Williamites fought for the opportunity to shape the Church as they saw fit. 
In Scotland, as well as other realms in the time period, more pious Christian 
oftentimes did not perceive military institutions as being separate from ecclesiastical 
ones. Trevor Royle notes that when formed, “the [Earl of Angus’s] regiment was as much 
a congregation as a fighting formation.” 6  Each company was assigned an elder and the 
regiment as a whole had a senior chaplain. A council composed of these men was 
responsible for making, or at least influencing, the major decisions regarding the running 
of the regiment. 7 It was a true church militant. The fear of religious persecution by the 
English and their fellow Scots was so great that the regiment was the only one in the 
army in which the men, whether on campaign or in garrison, received a standing order 
from their commander to carry their arms to church and post pickets during each service.8  
                                                 
5
 Hugh MacKay, Memoirs of the war carried on in Scotland and Ireland, ed. J.N. Hog et. al. (Edinburgh: 
Bannatyne Club, 1833), 11. 
6
 Trevor Royle, The Cameronians: A Concise History (Edinburgh, Mainstream Publishing, 2009), 16. 
7
 Thomas B. Macauley The History of England from the Accession of James II, Vol. III (New York, Harper 
& Brothers, 1870), 312. 
8
 Royle, The Cameronians, 16. This tradition was continued by the regiment until its disbandment in 1968. 
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Having only been recently raised, the Angus’s Regiment had yet to see action 
since its formation, and the men were nervous. This feeling was only intensified by the 
fact that the regiment had been ordered to Dunkeld without any support. 9 Many in the 
ranks believed that this plan was devised by the moderate Presbyterian government in 
Edinburgh to have them slaughtered.10  After all, their orders had come from the 
politicians, not MacKay or his subordinates.11 The men were also beginning to grow 
fearful of their officers’ intentions. A few days earlier, the regiment’s second-in-
command and field commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Cleland, had turned down 
surrender terms offered by the Jacobites.12 Some reinforcements had arrived to bolster the 
Williamite ranks, but quickly received contradictory orders that sent them away again.13 
This played harshly upon the soldiers’ minds and added to their anxiety, fear and anger. 
 As the battle approached, a group of soldiers made it known that the men were 
afraid that the officers would simply mount their horses and ride off at the first sign of 
fighting. The men’s fears upset Cleland, as many had served under him in the Covenanter 
War of 1679, in which they had been victorious over Claverhouse’s men at Drumclog. 14 
He knew he needed to inspire their confidence in him yet again. 
An anonymous account of the battle, published in Edinburgh just a few weeks 
after Dunkeld to commemorate the Williamite victory, tells us that faced with the 
                                                 
9
 The Exact Narration of the Conflict at Dunkeld, Betwixt the Earl of Angus’s regiment and the Rebels, 
Collected from Several Officers of that Regiment, who were Actors in, or Eye-witnesses to, all that’s here 
Narrated in reference to these Actions (Edinburgh; Unknown Publisher, 1689), 1-2. 
10
 Reid, I Met the Devil…,55. 
11
 John MacKay. The Life of Lieut. Gen. Hugh MacKay of Scoury. (Edinburgh; London; Glasgow: Laing 
and Forbes; W. Pickering; Smith and Son, 1836), 66. 
12
 Angus, aged 18, was deemed by his father, Marquess Douglas, too young to take command in the field; 
Ibid., 14-15. 
13
 The Exact Narration of the Conflict at Dunkeld…, 2-3. 
14
 Andrew Murray Scott, Bonnie Dundee (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1989), 22. 
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accusations of those in the ranks, Cleland “and the rest of the Gentlemen Officers 
amongst them, used all Arguments of Honour to persuade them to keep their Post.”15 
Cleland offered to shoot the horses himself if it would put the troops at ease, but they 
assured him it wouldn’t be necessary. Their fears allayed, the men prepared to do battle, 
as John Fortescue described, “with the immoral and worse, with the unorthodox.”16  
 At seven o’clock, the Jacobite commander, Colonel Alexander Cannon, ordered 
the assault troops forward. The town consisted of a few rows of houses, a dilapidated 
cathedral and Dunkeld House, the vacant residence of the Marquess of Atholl.17 While 
most of the Cameronians were deployed in the church and the manor, a few were 
stationed in the houses on the fringes of the village and were the first to be hit by the 
Jacobite assault. 
Armed with the latest government-issued flintlock muskets, these detachments, 
though greatly outnumbered, were able to hold off the Highlanders for some time before 
they were forced to retreat back to Dunkeld House.18 The Jacobites burst into the town, 
taking control of some ditches and buildings, which provided excellent cover for their 
musketeers. The fire on the Cameronian strongholds intensified as hand-to-hand fighting 
ensued in the streets. Amidst the carnage, Cleland was struck by two bullets, as an 
anonymous account described, “…one through the Head, and another through the 
Liver…,” and fell dead.19 Falling for a cause that he so zealously believed in, the 
colonel’s death would be mourned by both sides. When later describing the battle to 
James, Earl Balcarres, a leading Jacobite politician (then imprisoned in Edinburgh 
                                                 
15
 The Exact Narrative of the Conflict at Dunkeld…, 3-4. 
16
 John W. Fortescue A History of the British Army, Vol. I. (London: MacMillian, 1910), 342. 
17
 Reid, I Met the Devil…, 57. 
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 The Exact Narrative of the Conflict at Dunkeld…, 4. 
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 Ibid. 
6 
 
Castle), recounted Cleland’s actions that day as, “extremely brave.”20 Other Cameronian 
officers fell in rapid succession as the men began to run low on ammunition. It appeared 
that the soldiers’ worries of being wiped out might become a reality. 
Amidst the chaos, some of the Cameronians set out from the cathedral with 
torches in the hopes of burning down the other buildings in town to deny the Jacobites 
cover. Only three houses were left standing, forcing the town’s small civilian population 
to flee to the cathedral for safety.21 The Cameronians defending Dunkeld House ran out 
of ammunition and, as a result, were forced to break up the lead shingles from the roof 
and use the pieces as crude ammunition against their foe.22 Their improvisation proved to 
be effective. The battle continued to rage, the Highlanders realized that their preferred 
tactic of a frontal charge was useless in a town like Dunkeld. The many Highlanders 
without firearms became bogged down in the streets and were caught in the crossfire 
between friend and foe.23 One contemporary observer reported, “Not withstanding all the 
gallant resistance which these furious Rebels met with, they continued their Assaults until 
past eleven of the clock.”24 After four hours of indecisive, bloody fighting, the 
Highlanders withdrew.  
Just weeks earlier, when the news of the Jacobite victory at Killiecrankie reached 
Edinburgh, all had seemed lost for the Williamite cause in the northern kingdom. Now 
after what John MacKay, a descendent and biographer of the Williamite general, 
described as, “one of the hardest fought, and most desperate recorded [battles] in the 
                                                 
20
 Colin Lindsay, Earl of Balcarres, An account of the affairs of Scotland, relating to the revolution of 1688. 
As sent to the late King James II. When in France. By the Rt. Hon. The Earl Balcarras. Editor Unknown. 
2nd ed. (Edinburgh: W. Ruddiman jun. and Company, 1754), 74. 
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 The Exact Narrative of the Conflict at Dunkeld…, 6. 
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 Fortescue, 343. 
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 Reid, I Met the Devil…, 58. 
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 The Exact Narrative of the Conflict at Dunkeld…, 6. 
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annals of the seventeenth century,” the situation looked much less bleak for William and 
his followers.25 Though Jacobite morale had been somewhat shaken by death of their 
beloved Dundee a few weeks prior, after this engagement, Balcarres reported to James 
that, the “Highlanders were much discouraged.”26 To make matters worse for the Jacobite 
cause, as the harvest time approached, many of the Highlanders began to head home. The 
army was in no position to launch another offensive this year. 
For the Cameronians, their fear of slaughter had not been realized. The regiment 
had suffered substantial losses, particularly amongst the officer corps, but they had stood 
up against their hated Episcopalian foes and won a victory for the Covenant. Their stand 
had also won them the praise and respect of their moderate Presbyterian brethren, with 
whom they had maintained rather tenuous relations. A pamphlet published a few weeks 
later boldly proclaimed that the officers were: 
 …to be Recorded as Men of Worth and Valor. And the 
whole Souldiers did everything with such undaunted 
Courage and so little concern in all the Dangers and 
Deaths, which surrounded them and stared them in their 
Faces, and they deserve to be recommended as Examples of 
Valour to this and after Ages, and to have some Marks of 
Honour fixt upon them.27 
 
Dunkeld put a halt to Jacobite hopes of victory that had remained in Scotland and 
was a serious detriment to James’s cause in all the kingdoms. In the ensuing months, 
most of William’s troops would be sent to Ireland, where the struggle for the British 
crowns would be decided. Only a few regiments would be left in Scotland to consolidate 
the Williamite victory. Unlike the success in England which had been victory for the 
Anglican Church, King William’s triumph in Scotland had largely been a Presbyterian 
                                                 
25
 John MacKay, 68. 
26
 Balcarres, 75. 
27
 The Exact Narrative of the Conflict at Dunkeld…, 8. 
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one. Though the moderate Presbyterians and the Cameronians disliked each other almost 
as much as they hated the Episcopalian Highlanders, the two factions put aside their 
differences, secured a victory for William’s cause and set in motion a transformation of 
Scotland. The king’s subjects had started the realm down an uncertain path. The 
Revolution would alter the structure of Scotland’s government, church and the 
relationship between the crown and subjects. Although many would resist these changes, 
they would ultimately bring the realm (along with the other “united” kingdoms) to the 
status of a great imperial power. 
The inter-Protestant fighting during the Highland War, as exemplified by the 
intense combat at Dunkeld, was another chapter in the ongoing struggle between 
Presbyterians and Episcopalians for control of Scotland’s church. Religious tensions were 
just one of the causes of the intensity of the war which erupted in the north kingdom 
when the Glorious Revolution came to the kingdom. The common preconceptions of 
what happened during the Glorious Revolution and just what the event meant for the 
history of Britain have been largely shaped by the experiences of England and Ireland. In 
both cases, the narrative of the Revolution has been one of conflict between Catholic 
absolutism and Protestant constitutionalism. In Scotland’s case, there were religious 
motivations, but not of the same sort. There were also divisions between regions, 
socioeconomic systems and even individual families that were all exploited by the 
conflict. In its early stages many Scots hoped to use the turmoil of the Revolution to 
settle old scores and continue the civil fighting that had plagued the realm for decades. 
Yet by the end the conflict and the kingdom itself had become rather different.  By 
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examining this event in a uniquely Scottish context, however, we can begin to see the 
story of the Revolution in a different light. 
 
The course of the next two centuries of Scottish history was largely influenced by 
the events of the Glorious Revolution. Through one, comparatively small, war and a 
series of political settlements, the Scots ended nearly a century’s worth of civil conflict, 
secured their realm from arbitrary rule and began a process leading towards full religious 
toleration.  It is surprising that all of this occurred in the British kingdom with the most 
divided subjects. In terms of allegiance during the Revolution, the people of England and 
Ireland had very clear-cut divisions usually based on religious lines, but in Scotland, the 
complex system of rivalries and factions made uniting people into the ranks of the 
Williamite cause a considerable challenges.  The difficulty level was only increased by 
the fact that unlike in England and Ireland, William himself was never present to help his 
supporters achieve their goals. Instead, the Williamite cause was directed by men 
personally appointed to oversee their efforts. Lacking the commanding personality of the 
king himself and faced by a greatly divided population, these men were thrown into a 
virtual den of bitter religious sectarianism. At the forefront of these men was William’s 
commander-in-chief in Scotland, Major General Hugh MacKay. The war that broke out 
in Scotland following James’s flight from Britain had much more to do with the decades 
of tension in the country than the differing ideologies of the two claimants to throne. As 
the military leader in the kingdom, it was MacKay’s task to convince the competing 
factions within the population that William’s ideals were a worthier cause than their age-
10 
 
old rivalries, raise an army to defeat the Jacobites and to bring the Glorious Revolution to 
Scotland.  
In the first chapter, we will examine the pre-existing tensions within Scotland that 
caused its revolutionary experience to be far from “glorious” and different from those in 
the other kingdoms. In the second chapter, we will focus on actual narrative of the 
Revolution in the realm through the eyes of General MacKay. William’s trusted general 
was more directly involved with the events in Scotland as they occurred than anyone else 
and, through his communication with the politicians in Edinburgh and William’s court in 
England, was a primary link between the king’s Scottish subjects and the Revolution’s 
leaders.  
While the deeds of great Jacobite leaders and some of the events (usually the 
defeats) of the Jacobite rebellions have been romanticized and etched into popular history 
and culture in Scotland, little attention has been paid to the Williamite general and the 
campaign he won against absolutism. Perhaps it is because many modern-day Scots, so 
culturally and historically separated from their seventeen century ancestors, have chosen 
to embrace a “lost cause” ideology for the Jacobites, or that while the Jacobites were 
Scots themselves, MacKay, long absent from his ancestral home, and his Williamite 
troops have been remembered as foreigners who conducted one of countless invasions in 
the nation’s history. Nonetheless the man and the influence he had on the narrative of the 
Glorious Revolution repay further study. MacKay’s memoirs, military treatises and 
correspondence preserved both in the Melville-Leven Collection and the State Papers, 
which will be consulted in the next chapter, provide us with a complete and detailed 
account of the military campaign and political debates. These writings are filled with of 
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the ideals and themes of the Revolution, and his service for King William saw him in 
leading roles in the military operations in all of three British realms and, later, with 
British troops on the Continent. In his writings, his thoughts on duty to one’s king and 
kingdom help to illustrate just how important those values were to the people involved in 
this struggle. Most importantly, his strong beliefs in the ideas of nation, loyalty and the 
greater Protestant Church, which are present in all of his writings, drove him (along with 
his Dutch master) into the crusade against Catholic absolutism that cost him his life. In 
Scotland, however, it was MacKay’s task to rally the king’s subjects around these ideals 
and unify the people of the kingdom. Finally, after following the course Revolution itself 
through the eyes of MacKay, we will conclude by considering the aftermath and legacy 
of Scotland’s Revolution and how it can help us to better understand the event as a whole 
and the future political developments within early modern British history. 
Born around 1640 near the northern coast of the realm, MacKay, like many other 
Scots of the era, had spent most of his life abroad as a soldier.28 With years of service in 
Scottish regiments fighting for the French and Dutch and a brief period with the Venetian 
army on Crete, he had built up an international reputation for being a fine warrior and 
leader. In the years preceding the Revolution, he found himself in command of the 
Scottish and English troops that formed the Anglo-Dutch Brigade of William’s Dutch 
army. This put him in a rather precarious position when his own monarch, James, 
recalled him and his troops to prepare Britain for a Dutch invasion. MacKay began to 
question his allegiances. He had always been a loyal subject of James and planned to 
return to Britain to fight for his sovereign. Yet, he considered the allegiance he now owed 
to William, who was in essence, his military patron, and the threat James represented to 
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 Hugh MacKay, Memoirs…, xiii. 
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MacKay and his fellow Presbyterians. As a result, he decided to follow William in his 
campaign for the British crowns. He would ultimately serve his new king in all three 
realms during the Revolution and die fighting for him on the Continent, but it was in 
Scotland where he made his greatest contribution for the Williamite cause. The northern 
kingdom was far from inviting for a man who had been so long removed from his native 
realm that even he considered himself a foreigner.29 Nonetheless, MacKay knew the 
importance of the mission he had been given by William.30 After some initial doubt, he 
exclaimed in his memoirs that he was, “willing to contribute his utmost endeavors for the 
advancement of so good a cause,” and accepted the command.31 When he arrived in 
Edinburgh in the spring of 1689, MacKay began his campaign to unify the people of 
Scotland under one banner, an effort that would shape the history of the realm for years 
to come.  
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 Ibid., 3. 
30
 In the case of invasion from Ireland, the fear had become a reality during the civil wars, when Alexander 
MacColla had brought over Irish Confederates to fight with Montrose and his Royalists. 
31
 Ibid. 
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Chapter I: 
The Origins of the Conflict 
 
The Road to Revolution in Scotland 
The Battle of Dunkeld was a pivotal moment in the brutal civil conflict 
remembered in Scotland as the Highland War. From 1689 to 1692, the Scots fought each 
other in the name of the two claimants to the kingdom’s throne, James VII & II, and his 
son-in-law and nephew, Prince William of Orange, the recently crowned William III of 
England. This struggle was part of a larger conflict for control of the kingdoms of the 
British Isles, and, in a broader perspective, control of the balance of power in the wars 
against Louis XIV of France and his Catholic absolutism on the Continent. 
Posterity has remembered this series of events as it occurred in England as “The 
Glorious Revolution.” With little loss of life, England was transformed. Without the 
terror and violence that had plagued the kingdom during the three civil wars fifty years 
earlier or the political chaos of the Interregnum and Restoration, Parliamentary control 
over the crown was ensured, the Protestant succession was secured and the royal subjects 
immunized from arbitrary rule. But England was not the only kingdom for which James 
and William were fighting, and the experience there was far different than what unfolded 
in the other two. 
The story of the Glorious Revolution in Ireland, an event remembered there as 
“the War of Two Kings,” has taken a central place in popular history and culture. It was 
another chapter of the bitter confessional strife that had been plaguing the island since the 
first Protestants arrived. The war severely weakened the Catholic position there, at a cost 
14 
 
that was far from “glorious,” and would spark continual sectarian violence that lasted 
through the twentieth century, and in some aspects, to the present day. For the 
Protestants, their triumph is commemorated to this day, when many wear their finest 
shades of orange on July the twelfth and remember the Boyne. 
The Highland War, the military campaign for control of the Scottish throne, was 
an entirely different matter. With all the bloodshed and suffering that came with the war 
and the economic hardships that followed, it too was far from the “glorious” event that 
occurred in England. But unlike in Ireland, the battle lines in the former were drawn 
strictly along religious lines. In the Scottish context, religion was only one of the factors 
that drew the Scots to their respective camps. Nonetheless, the Highland War and the 
greater Glorious Revolution in Scotland was an integral part in William’s campaign for 
the British throne and was where his claim came most disastrously close to defeat. What 
made the revolutionary experience in Scotland different from the simultaneous events in 
England and Ireland was the unique political, socioeconomic and religious situations 
within the realm. By better understanding the Scottish context we will able to gain a 
better appreciation for not only the struggle for the northern kingdom, but William’s 
attempts for all the British crowns and the  broader significance of the Glorious 
Revolution. 
In his book, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746, Bruce Lenman argues 
that: 
Ultimately events in England were the determinants of what 
happened in Ireland and Scotland. The Glorious Revolution was 
made in England…In Scotland, there was indeed a distinct political 
upheaval comparable to the English one, but it only occurred 
because James lost control of England.1 
                                                 
1
 Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (London: Eyre Metheun, 1980), 32. 
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In his assertion that James’s flight from the throne in London set in motion the conflict in 
the northern kingdom, Lenman is certainly correct, but there was far from simply 
“political upheaval comparable to the English one.” The Highland War and William’s 
taking of the Scottish throne was yet another chapter in a narrative of continual conflict 
that had been plaguing Scotland for centuries. Throughout the seventeenth century, 
starting with the First Bishops’ War of 1639, it seem as though each new struggle seemed 
to be more devastating than the last. The terrifying campaigns of the Covenanter-turned 
Royalist James Graham, 1st Marquess of Montrose in the 1640s were far from forgotten, 
as was the traumatic “pacification” of the kingdom by General George Monck during the 
years of the Interregnum.2 
What made Scotland so volatile was a combination of rivalries and divisions 
unparalleled in the other kingdoms: denominational differences, regional rivalries and 
family feuds. The population was divided into multiple factions that oftentimes caused 
Scotsmen to have rather conflicted loyalties. These conflicted loyalties and the memories 
of the dominion’s violent past were what drove the kings’ subjects to choose their 
respective sides at the start of the conflict and created a distinctly Scottish experience of 
the Glorious Revolution that had all the bloodshed of the campaign in Ireland but, like the 
Revolutionary episode in England, was far more than another theater in the war between 
Catholics and Protestants. 
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The Protestant Church Divided 
One of the greatest of these divisions, as clearly displayed in the preceding 
account of the battle at Dunkeld, was along the doctrinal lines as the Protestant 
denominations in the realm fought to define Scottish Protestantism. The northern 
kingdom, wrote General MacKay in his memoirs, had “a church divided into two more 
irreconcilable factions though both calling themselves Protestants.”3 At the center of the 
religious spectrum in Scotland were the moderate Presbyterians. These were followers of 
John Knox who believed that a properly reformed church could exist alongside a 
monarchy and secular government. Their National Covenant of 1638 joined the 
Parliament and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in a pact with God, for 
which those who signed swore to defend. It was this faction that had opposed Charles and 
the Episcopalian Church the next two years and, in 1643, allied themselves with the 
English Parliamentarians in the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, as 
they had effectively taken over the governance of Scotland. Though Charles had signed 
the Covenant and formed an alliance with the Presbyterians at the time of the Third Civil 
War, the sovereign chose to support the Episcopal Church, souring his relationship with 
the Kirk. In the years before the Restoration, however, some Presbyterians began to think 
that a reformed church could not exist within the constraints of a monarchy (especially 
when the monarch refused to accept the Covenant) and a secular governing body. These 
groups, like the Cameronians, were considered rather “fanatick ” by both the moderate 
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Presbyterians and the Episcopalians and were thought to be a considerable threat to peace 
and stability.4  
The Episcopalian’s influence had been growing in the kingdom over the century 
leading up to the Revolution. Firmly committed to the Protestant cause, they appreciated 
the stability and security brought about by a hierarchical church structure and a strong 
monarch. The Episcopalians frequently looked to England and the realms’ shared 
monarch for support, even when he exercised no real power in Scotland (as was the case 
of Charles I during the civil wars). At the Restoration, Charles II unleashed a wave 
against the dissenting Parliamentarians and the Episcopacy became the state church for 
Scotland. They quickly gained control of the government and began the violent 
persecutions described previously. This sectarian violence would vary in intensity 
through the years leading up to James’s flight from the throne, only to be unleashed at 
full force with the start of the Highland War. 
The rise in prominence and power of the Episcopal Church in Scotland firmly 
planted the support of those people in James’s camp when the war began. Though he had 
lost the favor of his Anglican allies in England, for Scottish Episcopalians, James’s 
Catholic tendencies offered a much more palatable religious structure for the kingdom 
than was offered by the Presbyterians. Even though the Episcopalians and more moderate 
Presbyterians could enter into political alliances on occasion, their ideas on Church 
governance (and a general contempt on the part of the latter) always separated the 
denominations when it came to their view on Catholicism. James made efforts, as he had 
in England, to appease Episcopalians, Catholics, and to a certain extent, moderate 
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Presbyterians (the radicals being exempted), while under Presbyterian rule before the 
Restoration, toleration was non-existent for anyone who did not agree with the ideals of 
the Covenant  
The serious persecution of the radical Presbyterians occurred during the reign of 
Charles II, when his brother, then Duke of York, ruled in his absence. Though the 
ruthless killing for the extreme dissenters subsided when James ascended to the British 
thrones, the religious environment during his rule was far from static. With the 
Declaration of Indulgence in 1687, the king granted religious toleration to both 
Presbyterians and Catholics in his realms. In practice, however, the toleration was aimed 
more at Catholics than Presbyterians and did nothing for the more radical sects of the 
latter.5 After some of the leading government officials converted to the religion of their 
king, the Presbyterians began to question James’s intensions. Fearful of James’s future 
plans, the radical Presbyterian leaders, including many exiles who were yearning to 
regain control of the Church, began to reorganize, forcibly remove local Episcopalian 
ministers and make contingencies for the defense of the Lowlands.6 With the Episcopacy 
reeling from the flight of its monarch and protector, and James’s troops overextended and 
lacking serious high command, the Revolution gave the radical Presbyterians, as well the 
growing number of disaffected moderates, the chance to strike back. The moderates had 
been willing to bend to the king’s wishes at first, so as not to suffer from religious 
repression, but as James continued to increase his support of the Catholic and 
Episcopalian interests, in Scotland and the other kingdoms, the two Presbyterian camps 
grew closer together. So united was this resistance to James, that Balcarres, who felt his 
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deposed monarch need to be informed of the happenings in his kingdoms,  remarked, that 
the “Presbyterians [declared] entirely against” him.7  
It seems odd that with all the conflict along the confessional line on the Continent 
and in Ireland over the seventeenth century, that Protestants in Scotland were willing to 
fight each other so frequently. This situation was equally puzzling to some of the key 
players in the conflict. General MacKay, himself a moderate Presbyterian, wrote to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, the Earl of Melville, that he saw, “no essential difference 
betwixt Presbiterianisme [sic] and Episcopacy.”8 What MacKay failed to recognize was 
that the fighting between Presbyterians and Episcopalians was not for the eradication of 
one denomination, like the religious fighting on the Continent and Ireland was, but over 
the control of the state church, and indirectly, the government of the kingdom and its 
relationship to the monarch. Both denominations wanted to mold the Church to better fit 
with its ideal. With the Church so closely tied to the state, despite the best efforts of the 
radicals, both groups sought to influence the king and Parliament for their support gain 
indirect control over the government. Both Protestant groups were willing to use 
violence, a common political tool of the time, to coerce the other to achieve their desired 
ends. 
The religious divide and the struggle for control of Scotland’s state church was 
arguably the key point of contention that generated the realm’s bloody conflicts of the 
seventeenth century. The Protestant conflict was not an exclusive source of tension, 
however, as it frequently mapped itself onto other sources of division, like the kingdom’s 
great regional rivalry. In almost all aspects, the Highlands and Lowlands were markedly 
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different. This provided more reason for conflict, especially as each region was the 
stronghold of one of the competing Protestant denominations. In Ireland, the small 
Protestant minority was centered in the northeast of the island, but lived alongside a 
considerable population of Catholics. In England the members of the various religious 
denominations usually lived in rather heterogeneous populations. In Scotland, however, 
the denominational divide was clearly defined. The Highland Line, which divides the 
kingdom on a Northeast-Southwest axis, serves as a line of demarcation geographically, 
economically and religiously.9  
The Highlands had been a hotbed of fervent Episcopalians since James VI and I 
first began reinstating the Episcopacy in 1587 in an effort to reassert his control over the 
Church and over the Highland Chieftains who had been living above royal authority.10 By 
reinforcing hierarchical control over the religion and politics of the North (where 
Presbyterianism was weak), James was able to quickly create a core of loyal supporters 
bound to the Church as he saw it.11 The Lowlands, in contrast, served as the home for a 
predominately Presbyterian community, with the notable exceptions of the university 
centers of St. Andrews and Edinburgh. This concentration of coreligionists allowed for 
rapid spread of information within the various parishes and congregations. This could 
help secure the allegiances of subjects in a particular region and allowed to the population 
to be mobilized quickly in case of war. These denominational differences were only one 
of the many sources of confrontation that played into the narrative of Scotland’s Glorious 
Revolution. In some cases, one set of factions helped intensify another, as was the case 
with religious and regional rivalries. 
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The Lowland-Highland Divide 
As opposed to the wars in the other kingdoms, the clear geographic divide 
between the religious groups involved in the fighting created a virtual “no man’s land” 
between the two groups where much of the fighting occurred. In the case of the Glorious 
Revolution, while the military campaigns in Ireland occurred in nearly all the regions of 
the island, the fighting in Scotland in Scotland occurred almost exclusively in Perthshire 
(situated between the Lowlands and Highlands), which saved much of the rest of the 
realm from the hardships that came along with campaigning armies. 
Denominational differences were not the only characteristics that separated the 
people of the Highlands from their fellow subjects in the Lowlands. As the names of their 
regions might suggest, the two areas differed geographically. The Lowlands contained 
areas of large pastures, rolling hills and heather heaths, burgeoning urban centers and, in 
general appearance, was quite similar to the north of England. The people, who were 
largely feudal farmers, shepherds or cattle herders, differed little from their cousins 
across the border. English, the official language of both the Scottish Reformation and 
government, was the language of the Lowlanders. 12 Their shared language was useful 
tool when they looked south for trading opportunities. Though the Englishmen with 
whom the Lowlanders conducted their business were usually Anglican, unlike their 
Scottish Episcopal brethren, these High Church Protestants presented no threat to the 
control and stability of Scotland’s government. Besides, with a similar language, way of 
life and economic pursuits, the Lowlanders had more in common with the English across 
the Border then they did with their fellow Scots in the Highlands. This is probably best 
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exemplified by the large number of Lowland Scots who enlisted in England’s army in the 
years before the Revolution. With the enticements of better pay and more active service, 
at the time of the Revolution, more Scots served in the English army than that of their 
own kingdom.13 The rise in usage of English as the primary language in the northern 
kingdom and the impact it had on Scottish life, especially in the Lowlands, was slowly 
drawing the two realms together before 1688 and would help to make an easy transition 
when the Union came about in 1707. 
Even with increasing economic opportunity and social interaction across the 
border, life in the Lowlands was hard. The region’s position between the two kingdoms 
made it susceptible to incursions by large armies, both Scottish and English, whenever 
the two countries were at war throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When 
the land was not being occupied and the crops pillaged by invading armies, Lowlanders 
lived in constant fear of cattle and horse raids. Up until the start of the seventeenth 
century, the greatest threat of these came from the infamous “Border Reivers,” bandits 
who terrorized the people on both sides of the Tweed. In the decades leading up to 
Revolution, however, the threat primarily came from the Highlanders to the North. 
Whether forming part of a military expedition (like the “Highland Host” sent against the 
Cameronians during the Covenanter Wars) or conducting the expedition on their own, the 
Highlanders had a reputation for terrorizing and stealing from their fellow Scots that did 
nothing to ease the animosity between the peoples of the Lowlands and Highlands. 
Compared to the Lowlands, the Highlands seemed like an entirely different 
country. MacKay noted that the “country was full of mountains, bogs, woods, and 
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difficult passes with inaccessible retiring places.”14 Many who lived outside the 
Highlands shared MacKay’s view of the region as a wild, foreboding place. An 
anonymous, anti-Jacobite pamphlet on the Highlands and its people written after the 
Revolution, described the land as “Poor and Mountainous, Barren and Unhospitable.”15 
Accounts of the war told of how unforgiving the geography of the North was to 
campaigning armies. Macaulay, in his surprisingly detailed account of the military 
operations during the Revolution in Scotland, added to this imagery when he wrote of the 
challenges facing MacKay and his Williamite forces: 
It was difficult in such a country to track the enemy. It was 
impossible to drive him at bay. For an invading army was not to be 
found in the wilderness of heath and shingle; nor could supplies for 
many day be transported far over quaking bogs and up precipitous 
ascents.16 
 
The crags and rocky slopes were places where, as MacKay put it, “no wagons or carts 
could possibly follow.”17 Compared to the rolling hills of the Lowlands or the lush, green 
glens in Ireland, the Highlands were unforgiving, to both soldier and civilian alike, and 
did not provide much economic opportunity for the people who lived there. Some 
farming did occur, but with rough ground and bad weather, it was difficult. Many kept 
herd of sheep and cattle, another challenging livelihood in such unforgiving topography, 
which led to the aforementioned livestock raids, both in the Lowlands and against other 
Highlanders. With its rugged terrain, harsh climate, scattered settlements and little 
economic opportunity the Highlands were, as historian Andrew Scott describes, “a harsh 
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and Spartan place.”18 The majority of the realm’s poverty existed in the Highlands, but it 
was not just the rugged terrain of that made this area different. Though the craggy 
mountains, cliffs and rocky heaths may have been alien to the Lowlanders and English, 
the people who inhabited the Highlands were more so. This combination of unforgiving 
geography and intimidating people would prove to be the greatest challenge facing the 
Williamites in their attempt to gain control of the kingdom. 
 
The Highlanders and Their Way of Life 
 The Highlanders were, as a contemporary pamphlet noted, “strong, large, made 
hardy and rugged, rather desperate than bold, and rather ferocious than courageous.”19 
That desperation and ferocity were probably to compensate for their obsolete equipment, 
as many, like their Caledonian and Pictish ancestors centuries before, wielded swords, 
axes, and leather-covered shields, called targes, into battle. Thought they would be at a 
technological disadvantage against their Lowland and English foe, their backward 
fighting style and imposing physical appearance had certain tactical advantages. In battle 
the Highlanders’ weapons, as historian James Hill notes, “allowed [them] to make use of 
their quickness and agility against an enemy who was increasingly burdened by the 
weight of more modern and complex weapons and accoutrements… [Their strength] lay 
in their primitive offensive tactics.”20 As we shall see, the Highlanders were able to use 
their old-fashioned tactics and weaponry to their advantage at Killiecrankie, but in the 
crowded streets of Dunkeld and later, and more famously, on Culloden Moor, the 
clansmen would be defeated by the power of modern military technology. 
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 While the Highlands practiced an archaic form of warfare, they also lived within 
an age-old social system as well. During this time period, many in the Lowlands and even 
in England lived in feudal communities. In the Highlands, the communities were 
organized in a structure that even predated one’s connection to a lord: the clan. As 
historian Neil Davidson explains: 
During the seventeenth century Scotland was widely considered to 
be one of the few remaining areas in Europe where groups 
descended from a common ancestor, distinguished by a common 
name, and united with a common territory under the patriarchal 
authority of the chief could still be found.21 
 
Amidst the uninviting mountains and moors of the Highlands, the central government 
exercised no control over the people. As one anti-Jacobite pamphleteer described the 
Highlanders as a sort of natural absolutists, writing that they, “rude and barbarous… [and 
that] the Common people have no Laws of Government but the absolute Will of their 
Chief.”22  Where local lords and magistrates might have a say in community affairs in 
England and the Lowlands, the clan chieftain ruled on his own accord in what was a 
virtual mini-kingdom. This system of social organization was a far cry from the semi-
republican religious and political order of the Presbyterian Lowlanders.  
Scotland had a Parliament, but it was a Lowland phenomenon. The ruling 
government in Edinburgh had little power over the clans of the North. In their domains, 
the word of the chieftain was law. He controlled economic production, trade, local 
politics and even marriages. Some of the higher-status members of the clan could hold 
their own, as the pamphlet calls them, “tenants and vassals,” in the end, everyone within 
the clan answered to the chieftain, whether they be his closest relatives and his most 
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trusted counselors, or distant, peasant relatives, who worked tirelessly in the boggy fields. 
When the monarch needed to influence affairs in his northern realm, he would look to the 
chieftains, not his parliament, to see that his wishes were carried out. Even when clans 
grew too large and broke off into smaller sects, homage and obedience were often given 
to the senior chieftain of the group, even if it meant a clan putting itself in jeopardy. In 
1689, the members of Clan MacKay found themselves surrounded by rival, Jacobite clans 
along the northern coast of Scotland and, thus, decided to stay out of the fighting in order 
to protect their families and land. However, as soon as news came that the General 
MacKay, the eldest surviving (and long absent) son of the clan chieftain, had been chose 
to act as William’s commander-in-chief in the realm, the clan decided to fully support 
William and sent a party of Highlanders to join the army of their kinsman.23  
 The members of a clan were expected to follow the wishes and orders of the 
chieftain, even if it meant their death. In return, the clansmen expected the chieftain and 
the other upper-class members of the clan, whom Stuart Reid refers to as, “warrior 
aristocracy,” to provide order and protection for the community and to lead the clan’s 
men boldly into the thick of battle.24 As Hill explains, nothing mattered more to the 
Highlanders and their military culture than “pride and honour.”25 Above all, the honor of 
the clan was reflected upon all of its members, but most importantly, its leader. All were 
mindful to not commit any acts that would taint the family name. This unfailing sense of 
allegiance to chieftain and kin was a key pillar in Highland ideology and would be one of 
the toughest challenges the faced MacKay and other Williamite leaders a they tried to 
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mould the views of the people of Scotland into their own ideas. Their task was made even 
more difficult when the clans’ actions and allegiances were affected by the long-standing 
rivalries that plagued the Highlands. 
 
Family Feuds 
One can imagine that in a region with few resources, little economic opportunity 
and a society where honor and pride were essential values, conflict was difficult to avoid. 
Throughout sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, little wars between individual clans were 
almost constant throughout the region and greatly influenced outsiders’ views of the 
Highlanders as violent and uncivilized people. As the post-war, anti-Jacobite pamphlet 
explained, the inhabitants of the region “decide their personal Breaches very often by the 
Sword, in which sometimes, from the Differences between 2 mean Persons, the whole 
Families are engaged, and they often come to pitch’d battles…”.26 Personal grudges 
between chieftains quickly became the concern of the clan as a whole, would often cause 
an increase in hostilities with the rival clan that could include pitched battles, murders, 
kidnappings or raids. These family feuds only intensified with each eye-for-an-eye stroke 
and had plagued the Highlands for centuries. Though the 1603 Statutes of Iona had tried 
to make the chieftains toe the line set by James VI, the fragile peace was only temporary. 
As the British kingdoms devolved into chaos in the middle part of the seventeenth 
century, the old rivalries were renewed and blood was once again spilled in the 
Highlands. Once unleashed, this type of hatred was hard to contain, and the feuding 
continued well into the Revolution and beyond.  In John MacKay’s biography of his 
Williamite ancestor, he described how quickly the situation deteriorated when the 
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Revolution came to, “the lawless state of the Highlands, in which bloody family feuds, 
and even private wars among the clans, were not yet extinguished.”27 As the political 
leaders played the religious divisions in the realm to their advantage at the start of the 
Revolution, so too did they seek to manipulate the clan rivalries in the Highlands. Clans 
that had benefitted from the previous Stuart monarchs were eager to support James again, 
while the Williamites sought to gain the support of their rival clans, especially those who 
had long supported the Covenant. 
 This was not a new political tactic, as it had been used by the kingdom’s political 
leaders at the time of the civil wars, but was a useful way to gain support from a highly 
fractious population. Though the Highland clans share the same religion and same 
identity, some of the great chieftains of the North occasionally broke the trend and 
formed alliances with the Lowland Presbyterians. The most notable of these men were 
the chieftains of Clan Campbell, the hereditary Earls, and later Marquesses and Dukes, of 
Argyll. These chieftains, though Episcopalians and the leaders of arguably the most 
prominent family in the Highlands, staunchly supported the Covenanter government in 
the decades of the civil wars and the Williamite government during the Revolution. This 
political maneuvering was often aimed to claim an advantage in numbers in Highland 
feuding and putting the chieftain’s clan on the side of the government in power which, at 
least during the civil wars and the Revolution, was controlled by the Covenanters.28 
By standing in line with the predominantly Presbyterian and Lowland 
government, a chieftain could hope to be rewarded for his service with power, money or, 
most importantly, land, all of which were often granted at the expense of his clan’s rivals. 
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In the confusing political world of early modern Scotland, however, this shifting of 
allegiance could put the chieftain and his clansmen in a precarious position if their side 
were to lose power, which frequently occurred. This dynamic system of control was 
largely due to the Scottish kings’ absentee status in the realm following the Union of the 
Crowns in 1603. Generally, those whom they chose to oversee the realm lacked the 
political strength (James’s governance during Charles II’s reign excepted) to rule 
efficiently, and sometimes, as was the case in the late 1630s, lost complete control of the 
government.  The clans that had sided with Covenanters certainly came out ahead of their 
rivals when their Lowland allies took control of the kingdom in 1638. When royalist 
resurgences occurred, with the restoration of Charles II in 1660 and James’s change in 
policy following the ill-fated rebellion of 1685, the chieftains who had turned to the 
South for support became the first target for the vengeful kings. The same situations held 
true in reverse to the clans who stood by Charles I and James II when the authority of the 
monarch was threatened. No matter who they supported, choosing to throw their clan into 
the volatile political game of seventeenth century Scotland was a serious gamble for the 
Highland chieftains. Some were able to gain power, land and influence, but more often 
than not, it brought great loss to the leader and his people. In the case of the Campbells of 
Argyll, who had supported the Covenanters in the middle of the century and later allied 
with the Duke of Monmouth, it meant executions and forfeitures of both land and titles. 
 Expecting that type of retribution to be visited upon the losers of the civil 
conflicts, many clans chose to remain loyal to their monarch, even when he had lost 
control of the kingdom, in the hopes of profiting from Parliament and the Presbyterian’s 
misfortunes. Thus, both before and throughout the conflicts of the seventeenth century, 
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the various sects of Clan MacDonald and their staunch allies in Clan Cameron found 
themselves joining whomever the Campbells were fighting in the hopes of regaining 
some of their ancestral lands and political clout. Clan allegiances during wars were not 
always clear-cut however, as historian Robert Barnes writes, that sometimes clans would 
split their allegiance between the competing factions so that the, “family estates would be 
secure and personal safety assured.”29 Though we will see instances of the latter during 
the course of the Revolution, the vast majority of the Highland clans used the various 
conflicts fought within Scotland to gain political advantages and get ahead of their local 
rivals. Though family rivalries existed in the other British kingdoms, they were not nearly 
prevalent as they had once been. The inter-clan warfare in Ireland, much of which had 
been instigated by Scottish relatives, had petered out by this point in time as the majority 
of the fighting there was now almost strictly religious-based. The level to which rivalries 
existed between the Highland clans and the politicking the clan chieftains were used by 
Scotland’s political leaders in this era was uniquely Scottish. It was another dimension of 
division within the realm, yet one that was not ideological like those in England and 
Ireland which tore the realms apart when William threatened James’s claim to the throne. 
 
The Revolution in Scotland 
Throughout the seventeenth century, the three British kingdoms endured a series 
of brutal conflicts, the last being the Glorious Revolution. Though each of these struggles 
started for the same reasons and occurred simultaneously in all three realms, they ways in 
which they unfolded were dramatically different in each kingdom due to the unique 
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social, religious and economic structures in each. The situation in England led to a 
relatively peaceful transition of power, the circumstances in Ireland led to a bloody war 
with repercussions that continued well into the present day. As we have examined, when 
the Revolution came to Scotland, pre-existing tensions were again torn open in military 
conflict. Though William achieved his goal of taking the crown of the British kingdoms 
and bringing them into his struggle against the absolutism of Louis XIV’s France, the 
Revolution in Scotland did not bring all the peace and stability it had to England nor did 
it reinforce sectarian division that would cause more bloodshed for the next three 
centuries, as it had in Ireland. In Scotland’s case, the Revolution’s settlements helped to 
ease much of the tension that had troubled the kingdom and its inhabitants, but gave the 
realm a new set of problems. The terror of the war combined with the economic 
hardships caused by Scotland’s forced commitment to the fighting on the continent set in 
motion series of events that would result in union with England and a dramatically 
different future. 
 We will now examine just how Scotland’s revolutionary experience unfolded, 
how those events created the new set of issues for the realm and how the revolution’s 
narrative in Scotland is unique amongst the three kingdoms. Scotland’s pivotal role in the 
story of the Glorious Revolution has been long overlooked, brushed aside by the 
preconceptions from the English and Irish experiences. By looking at the events in the 
northern kingdom from a Scottish context, we can increase our understanding of the 
event itself and the impact it had on British, and more broadly, global history.   
To better understand the events of the Highland War and Scotland’s experience 
within the Glorious Revolution as a whole, we will now examine the narrative from the 
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perspective of King William’s commander in the realm, General MacKay. More than 
anyone else in the realm, he maintained constant contact with the various factions in the 
conflict: the Convention of Estates, William’s court in England, the Cameronians and 
even the Jacobites. In his memoirs, letters and treatises, we can see that he truly believed 
in the Williamite ideals of honor, duty and had a strong belief of the Protestant cause. 
Through his service in the military operations of the Revolution in all three kingdoms 
and, later on the continent with William, MacKay was able to observe and gain insight on 
the entire event from outside the realm of the political maneuvering. No other player in 
the narrative had the same opportunity. Though a Scot by birth, he felt far removed from 
his homeland. In fact, when word first came of his master’s intentions to send him to his 
homeland, he wrote that he “was then very indisposed for such an expedition.” 
Additionally, he feared that “the disposition of that kingdom [was] tending to a civil 
war.”30 The situation that faced the general upon his arrival in Edinburgh was far from 
welcoming, but MacKay understood the importance of securing the northern kingdom for 
William. Spurred on by the success in England and his faith in the ideals of the 
Williamite Revolution, he “embraced the command.”31
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Chapter II: 
 
Hugh MacKay and the Glorious Revolution 
 
 
 
The Calm before the Storm 
 
 The battle fought by the Cameronians at Dunkeld was the great turning point of 
the Highland War. Before that engagement, the Williamite efforts in Scotland had not 
been going well. In fact, it was in this kingdom that William’s forces suffered their only 
serious battlefield defeat. It came at a battle that was larger and far bloodier than the one 
that took places within the confined streets of Dunkeld and one that would be 
immortalized in the narrative of the Jacobite history of Scotland: Killiecrankie. 
On the afternoon of July 27, 1689, Major General Hugh MacKay marched his 
small army of 3,500 men through the pass of Killiecrankie in Perthshire. Throughout the 
spring and early summer, the general and his Williamite forces had been playing, what 
Andrew Scott has called, “an elaborate chess game” across the Highlands with Viscount 
Dundee and his Jacobite clansmen.1 When the Williamites would advance in one 
direction, Dundee would counter with greater numbers, but if the Jacobites tried to press 
their advantage, they often found their movements checked by effective use of Williamite 
cavalry or, as one contemporary account described, “faint Marches and Counter-Marches. 
[sic]”2 The topography of the Highlands was far from welcoming for an invading army 
and made supplying the Williamite troops difficult. Additionally, Dundee’s Highland 
warriors, like of those who fought during the civil wars with his kinsman, Montrose, 
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proved to be a frustrating opponent for MacKay’s predominantly Lowland and English 
regulars through their use of irregular tactics and rapid maneuvering over the rugged 
terrain of the Highlands. Negotiating the politics and rivalries of the region added yet 
another level of complexity to the Williamite endeavors. Despite the hardships, MacKay 
had kept his army together and was finally bringing Dundee to battle in advantageous 
circumstances. 
Just two weeks earlier, the Williamites, thinking they had adequately contained 
the Highlanders for the time being, had marched back to the kingdom’s capital to refit 
and resupply. It was, however, a short stay. By July 21 MacKay’s small army was once 
again on the move, headed towards Inverlochy and another Williamite force led by the 
Earl of Argyll.3  Their march took them through Atholl, where the Jacobite stronghold of 
Blair Castle was under siege. MacKay advanced towards the manor but became rather 
vigilant when he received word that Dundee’s army was approaching with the intent of 
relieving the castle’s garrison. MacKay’s men reached the pass around noon on the July 
27 and cautiously navigated its narrow track for the next four hours.4  Once through the 
obstacle, the advance guard spotted the first of the Jacobites. In response, the general 
formed his men upon what he called, “ground fair enough to receive the enemy, but not 
to attack them.”5 He knew that his regulars had a significant advantage in firepower over 
Dundee’s Highlanders and thus thought it best to take a defensive stance. Dundee obliged 
and deployed his men with, as MacKay described, “his back to a very high hill, which is 
the ordinary maxim of Highlanders, who never fight against regular forces upon any 
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thing of equal terms.”6 MacKay expected Dundee’s men to charge downhill, using the 
high ground to gain momentum as they charged and hit with an immense of force. 
MacKay’s troops would only have a limited opportunity to shoot at the Highlanders 
before the enemy would be upon them and their volleys would not be fired across a flat, 
open field unlike those aimed at a later generation of Jacobites at Culloden. The 
Highlanders had used this strategy in countless engagement since the Civil War and it 
was a key factor in their battlefield successes. Just the thought of battle with the clansmen 
must have been intimidating to the Williamites. 
Once arrayed, the armies waited for the battle to begin. Faced with such an 
imposing and unorthodox foe, anxiety grew within the Williamite ranks. As James Hill 
describes, “the mere spectacle of a Highland horde looming menacingly on a hillside was 
often enough to frighten battle-harden veterans.”7 MacKay himself noted that, “all our 
officers and soldiers were strangers to the Highlanders way of fighting and embattling, 
which mainly occasioned the consternation many of them were in.”8 The general busied 
himself making final preparations along his battle line. With a serious engagement 
looming, MacKay thought it best to give some encouraging words to his troops. Turning 
to his nearest battalions, he, as described in his memoirs: 
 
made a short speech…representing the 
unquestionable justice of the cause, regarding not only the 
Protestant interest in Britain, but in all the world, whose 
loss humanly seemed mainly to depend on the success of 
his Majesties enterprise, for the defence thereof, as well the 
temporal happiness temporal happiness of their country, 
consisting in the maintainance of their lawes, which 
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confirmed it to them besides the obligation of honour and 
conscience, which lay upon them not to betray by a 
criminal faintheartedness their masters service but whom 
they were entertained, and last of all their own safety, 
assuring them that if they kept  firm and close they would 
quickly see their enemy’s take to the hills for their 
refuge…To avoid, then, certain ruines, the only visible 
mean was to stand to it, like men fighting for their religion 
and liberty against invaders of both, which was the true 
ground of his Majesties enterprise, and not the desire of a 
crown as it was of all good men and true Protestant subjects 
in conjunction with and assistance to him therein, and not 
the prospect of advantage by the change .”9 
 
 In just a few sentences, MacKay reminded the men of the ideals of the Williamite 
cause. Surprisingly, his message did not include any reminders of the divisions that 
plagued Scotland. There was no mention of Presbyterians and Episcopalians, Lowlands 
and Highlands or clans. Instead the general spoke of the broader ideas of subjecthood, 
country and the Protestant faith. Although the kingdom’s internal divisions had driven 
many to fight in the war, MacKay had good reason not to mention those sources of 
tension. First was the fact that the general, though born in the kingdom, was for all intents 
and purposes, an outsider and freely admitted it. Though he was aware of the instability 
within the realm, his long-time absence from Scotland had caused him to be somewhat 
disconnected from most of these rivalries and seldom indicates any ill will tied to those 
grudges. Even when it came to religious views, of which his own were strongly Calvinist, 
MacKay took care to refer to “the Protestant interest” and not a particular denomination, 
a habit he continued throughout his writings. Ever since leaving the service of the French 
army, MacKay seems to have tried to emulate his commander, William, the great 
Protestant champion of Europe.  Although the Revolution’s Scottish campaign was not 
centered along traditional confessional lines, the Williamites hoped to secure Scotland as 
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a strong, Protestant kingdom through MacKay’s military efforts. In William’s service he 
had always used his Protestant beliefs as a source of motivation and a goal for his 
endeavors. Though the nature of the war was different from those in which he was 
previously engaged, the old general still turned to the same inspirations he always had as 
he prepared for battle and hoped his men would do the same. 
MacKay also likely chose not to mention Scotland’s internal struggles because of 
the heterogeneous nature of his army. There were both Lowland and Highland soldiers in 
the Williamite ranks, making the argument of regional rivalries unimportant. For the 
many Lowland Scots, the idea of clan rivalries would not have been as important as it 
was to their Highland comrades. It had been those very rivals that led many of the latter 
to William’s banner in the first place. These men represented a very small portion of the 
MacKay’s army and may not have even been near the general when he spoke. For the 
Lowlanders and Englishmen in the ranks, the clan system was foreign and archaic, and 
though a trigger of the conflict, had little impact on their lives. MacKay’s oration was not 
mean to discuss the problems that plagued the kingdom. He was trying to remind his men 
that they were fighting for something greater than the petty rivalries which had caused so 
much bloodshed 
 The most important idea that MacKay hoped to instill in his men was that it even 
if the kingdom’s civil rivalries had inspired Scots to fight, they were not the main 
objective of the Williamite cause. While the realm had existed in a fractured state for the 
better part of a century and those in both camps hoped it would continue to be so (with 
their particular interest group in power), William wanted not only a united Scotland, but 
three kingdoms of subjects who would stand together with him in his efforts against 
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international Catholicism, embodied in the form of the absolutist ambitions of Louis XIV. 
In the other realms, Protestants of various denominations fought together against 
common enemies, regional rivalries were practically non-existent, and family feuds 
seldom sparked full-scale wars.  
MacKay and the other Williamite leaders hoped that Scotland would assimilate 
into the large Williamite interest. In a way, MacKay’s speech shows us that he was 
thinking of the larger context and replacing these considerations with greater goals. He 
was a professional soldier who had returned to his homeland to conduct a campaign and 
did not remain past its conclusion. How the war’s results would shape Scotland’s internal 
rivalries would have no effect on MacKay once he left the kingdom. As an officer in two 
of the British armies and a loyal subject of William, however, MacKay’s future would be 
immediately affected by William’s success or failure in Britain and on the Continent. His 
stake in the larger Williamite effort far outweighed his concern for Scotland’s deep-
seeded internal issues.  
The Highland War and the Scottish involvement of the Glorious Revolution had 
begun as another link in a chain of civil conflict, but by the time of Killiecrankie had 
been mapped onto something much larger than the Presbyterian-Episcopalian divide or 
family feuds. The Williamites in all the kingdoms were beginning to look at themselves 
as members of more collective groups and at their individual realms as strong nations 
(and for some, as part of a united kingdom).  MacKay served as a link between the two 
ideas: a product of the factional old Scotland and a servant of the new ideas about Britain. 
As the sun began to set at Killiecrankie, and Dundee ordered his Highlanders forward, 
many must have wondered how this war would change their homeland. 
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A Martial Tradition 
 The exact date of MacKay’s birth is unknown, but historians agree it was 
probably in 1640. The son of the clan chieftain, he was born into a family that was one of 
the most prominent in the Highlands and had a respected martial reputation. His father, 
also Hugh, was a colonel who served both Parliament and the Crown during the course of 
the civil wars, an exploit shared by many of his fellow Scots.10 The elder Hugh’s brother, 
William, commanded a regiment of Scots in the Swedish army of Gustavas Adolphus and 
was killed, along with the famed Protestant monarch, at the Battle of Lützen during the 
Thirty Years’ War in 1632.11  For the future general, there were certainly high 
expectations for his military skill. What he could not know was that though he began his 
career as a simple, junior officer, he would one day help dramatically shape the history of 
his homeland and Britain as a whole. His experience and the events of the larger context 
of the era would shape him into an ideological warrior. 
 Having a military hero in one’s family was a sure way to gain prestige and honor 
for one’s clan.12 The Scots and Irish in particular were renowned across the Continent for 
their martial prowess. Warfare was almost constant throughout seventeenth century 
Europe and since the leaders of the great powers needed as many men as they could find 
to fill the ranks of their large armies, the recruitment of mercenaries and auxiliaries 
became extremely common. As John Childs describes, “On the outbreak of war, it was 
often cheaper and more expedient to rent trained regiments from abroad than to rely 
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wholly upon whipping new recruits into possible soldiers.”13 With little hope for 
employment in their homeland and dreams of gaining honor for themselves and families 
on the battlefield, many Scots answered the calls for recruits from the foreign kings and 
princes. European armies, both Catholic and Protestant, contained Scottish regiments, 
allowing many Scots to gain notoriety in the many battles of the era. Both MacKay and 
his future adversary, Dundee, went to the Continent in their youth hoping to do the same 
and at Killiecrankie, nearly half of MacKay’s army was made up of such men. 
 In 1660, the young MacKay took a commission in Dumbarton’s Regiment, or as it 
was more commonly known, the Royal Scots.14 This regiment was formed in Scotland 
1633 with authorization from Charles I to serve as auxiliaries (essentially on loan) in the 
French army, a common practice in early modern Europe. Though MacKay was born a 
Protestant, the Catholic army of Louis XIV was the most sophisticated in Europe at the 
time and many Scots were willing to lay aside religious scruples for the chance to learn 
the art of war from the experts. 
 MacKay’s first years in Louis’ army were rather uneventful, but in 1669 he was 
offered his first chance for battlefield glory. That year, the Sun King sent a large 
contingent of volunteer officers, including MacKay, to aid the Venetians in their attempt 
to drive the Turks from the island of Candia (Crete).15 The Scotsman served with such 
distinction throughout the campaign, that he was awarded a gold medal by the Venetian 
Republic.16 
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Figure 1.  Hugh MacKay, from the frontpiece of The Life of Lieutenant General Hugh 
MacKay by John MacKay, 1836. (Public Domain) 
 A few months later, he returned to France and his old regiment. Over the next few 
years, the diplomatic situation on the Continent deteriorated and in 1672, England and 
France went to war with the Dutch.  Dumbarton’s Regiment began actively campaigning 
in the Netherlands and it was while stationed in a small town there that MacKay 
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befriended, and later married, the daughter of one of the region’s noble families. The year 
was not all joyous for MacKay and marked a period of change in MacKay’s ideals and 
sense of duty.  The brutal campaign waged by the French against the Protestants seemed 
to have finally shocked the young Scots Presbyterian and gave him an aversion for Louis 
and his Catholic absolutism. In response, MacKay decided to resign his royal commission 
with the Royal Scots and join his fellow Scots in the service of the Protestant army of 
William of Orange.  
 
The Anglo-Dutch Brigade 
When he joined the Dutch army, the young Scotsman was given a commission as 
a captain in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, a formation of three English and three Scots 
regiments that had been in Dutch service since 1593. Unlike Dumbarton’s Regiment, 
which was officially a Scottish regiment in the English army loaned to the French by 
Charles II (by definition, auxiliaries), the Anglo-Dutch brigade was formed entirely from 
permanent regiments within the Dutch army.  
To our modern understanding, the ability to switch allegiances in the middle of a 
war without any sort of penalty seems like an odd arrangement, but in a world where the 
presence of foreign auxiliaries and mercenaries in an army was, as John Childs describes, 
“unexceptional.”17 Like modern footballers on loan, these young officers were serving 
abroad in order to gain experience, but could transfer their commissions between English 
and Scottish regiments, both auxiliary and mercenary, in the various armies of the 
Continent or those in the British Isles if they so wished. To take up his new post in the 
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Anglo-Dutch Brigade of William’s army, MacKay first had to resign his commission in 
the English army, but there is no evidence of any opposition to that action.  
Charles II, and could usually spare the surplus military men the British kingdoms 
had at his disposal and the officers and men of the Anglo-Dutch brigade were still viewed 
as subjects of the king of England and Scotland. Though these men were in the pay of the 
Dutch Republic, the Stuart monarchs would often give William advice on how to run the 
affairs of the brigade (which was usually ignored) and, as Childs explains, “Could 
summon the brigade into [Britain] to assist him in a military emergency.” 18 Since they 
were still concerned subjects of the British realms, all were expected to respond to the 
call of their sovereign monarch when it came without question, but at times of peace, this 
form of overseas service was generally not a conflict of England’s interest.  
Unlike today’s footballers who must sit out when their loan team plays their home 
club, this system meant that British officers could sometimes find themselves in a 
precarious position if the army which they now served fought the English Army and the 
king in London called the soldiers home. This had been the case at the start of the Anglo-
Dutch War of 1665, when the English regiments of the brigade were recalled by Charles 
and all obliged, only to return in 1674.19 A decade later, when James recalled the brigade 
in preparation for William’s invasion, the question of loyalty within the brigade would 
become a serious issue for the first time. 
  MacKay added to his reputation in the service of the Dutch and even gained the 
attention of William himself at the Battle of Seneffe in 1674, resulting in the prince’s 
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orders to promote MacKay to the rank of major.20 Ironically, another Scot also gained 
William’s interest and favor at the battle: John Graham of Claverhouse, the future 
Viscount Dundee. Like MacKay, Dundee (who himself came from a distinguished 
military family) had taken a commission abroad looking to gain experience, pay, 
adventure and fame. Dumbarton’s Regiment aside, there were more opportunities for 
aspiring Scots in William’s army, so Claverhouse, like many other officers who would 
later serve James or William, decided to throw his lot in with the Dutch. He, like 
MacKay, quickly made a name for himself as a cornet in William’s Life Guard and even 
saved William’s life at Seneffe. As a reward for the deed, the prince promised the 
Scottish cavalier a future promotion.21  
 Shortly after the campaign ended, a position as lieutenant colonel of one of the 
Scottish regiments in the Anglo-Dutch brigade became available. William chose MacKay 
over Claverhouse for this appointment, an action that the latter took as a personal insult 
and greatly influenced his decision to leave the Dutch for a commission in the cavalry of 
Scotland’s own army.22 This snub along with his later patronage from James and a family 
legacy of fighting for the Stuart kings (he was a close relative of the Royalist commander 
in Scotland during the civil wars), would all help to push Claverhouse into the Jacobite 
camp when revolution came in 1688, an example of the personal motivations for 
allegiance, rather than ideological ones, that brought many of the Scots into the conflict.  
The Third Anglo-Dutch War came to an end in 1678 and two years later, as the 
army was reorganized in peacetime, MacKay found himself with the rank of colonel, 
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command of all six regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and the trust and respect of his 
army’s commander, Prince William.23 The Scottish officer had served in three armies on 
the Continent over the course of the previous two decades, but had yet to fight for his just 
natural king (the wishes of Louis and William had always affected his service). In his 
most recent war, he and the men of the Anglo-Dutch brigade had even fought against the 
allies of their sovereign king. The Dutch not only provided MacKay and his fellow 
Britons with money, but had a system of government and religious ideals that were more 
appealing to some than the Pro-Catholic absolutism of Charles II and James II. Some, 
like Claverhouse, viewed service in William’s army as a means of employment and still 
felt a strong sense of allegiance to their sovereign king. For MacKay and others like him, 
preference towards William and his cause would soon create a serious conflict of interest. 
 
Conflicted Loyalties 
 The accession of James II to the British thrones brought a great deal of unrest to 
MacKay’s homeland. When threatened by the invasions of the Dukes of Monmouth and 
Argyll, the king quickly called upon his subjects, both auxiliaries and mercenaries, 
serving in armies abroad to return to fight the rebels, though both threats were defeated 
before the Anglo-Dutch brigade saw any action.24 Nonetheless, the king seemed pleased 
enough, as John MacKay described, with the Anglo-Dutch Brigade’s “prompt obedience 
to his call, and with their soldierly appearance” and wanted to strengthen the Scotsman’s 
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bond of loyalty that he promoted MacKay to the rank of major general in English 
service.25 
 MacKay and his troops remained in Britain for several months after the rebellions 
were extinguished before returning to Holland. During that time, the general visited his 
estates in Scotland that he had inherited after the murder of his two brothers in 1668. This 
act was another episode in a longstanding feud between the MacKays and the 
neighboring Sinclairs, who battled for supremacy in the north of Scotland.  Even before 
the Glorious Revolution, the harsh realities of Highland life had a personal impact on the 
MacKay’s life even though they were so far removed while he served on the Continent. 
The aftermath of Argyll’s rebellion marked the first time MacKay set foot in 
Scotland since he left for the army in 1660.26 MacKay spent his remaining weeks in 
London, where he wrote a letter to William. This was probably at the request of James, 
who having just put down a rebellion led by a blood-relation and claimant to the throne, 
probably wanted to use MacKay to ensure relations were amicable between London and 
The Hague. MacKay began the correspondence by thanking William for his cooperation 
during the rebellion, explaining that the king “was well persuaded of your Highness’ 
good inclination to his person and interest.”27 After going into detail regarding James’s 
opinion of the Anglo-Dutch brigade, the general concluded the letter to his commander 
on the Continent,  
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with my earnest prayer to God for such an inseparable 
union and harmony between his Majesty and his nearest 
relations to the maintenance of the royal dignity, that all 
contrivances of such as labour to interrupt the course of so 
anciently established a monarchy in Britain may never be 
able to reverse or undo it in whose divine direction and 
protection I heartily recommend your Highness’ person and 
concerns as being unfeighnedly [sic].28 
  
 In the letter, MacKay’s allegiances do not appear to be in question. At this point, 
the general viewed James as his rightful monarch, while William, who he more closely 
paralleled on an ideological level, was his superior officer and employer. Few in the 
British kingdoms had a quarrel with James in the early stages of his reign, a fact proven 
by the support for the king during the Monmouth and Argyll rebellions. Unfortunately for 
MacKay, events were quickly initiated that would break “inseparable union and 
harmony,” as William began forming “contrivances” of his own. This looming conflict 
would set the Scotsman’s two commanders-in-chief against each other in battle and 
would test the allegiances of the general who served them both. 
 With stability restored to Britain, the general returned to the Netherlands, but his 
stay was rather short. Throughout 1687 and 1688, the king’s pro-Catholic and absolutist 
actions provoked unhappy public responses throughout his realms. In Scotland, as in 
England, James issued the Declaration of Indulgence, which nominally gave rights to 
those who worshiped outside of the state church. In practice this meant enhanced rights 
for James’s fellow Catholics, though the privileges were eventually expanded to include 
moderate Presbyterians. The kingdom’s more radical Calvinists were still considered a 
threat by the monarchy and were not included in the indulgence. In fact, James followed 
his brother’s example in the brutal repression of this group, oftentimes using the power of 
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the standing armies he illegally kept in his kingdoms. While the moderates conformed 
quietly to the king’s policies in the hopes of regaining some of their rights and power, 
they were well aware of the vicious treatment of their fellow Presbyterians and grew 
increasingly frustrated with the Crown. In theory, James hoped that his actions would 
draw the moderates into his camp, but in practice, his policies pushed them away. As a 
result, moderate Presbyterians grew closer to the radical members of their denomination, 
with whom they had previously refused to co-operate since the Restoration settlement. 
Scotland was not the only place where resentment towards the king was growing and his 
pool of supporters was rapidly losing strength and size. 
With the Protestant demonstrations came rumors of a Dutch invasion. This caused 
James to seriously consider how he might react militarily to an intervention by William. 
Not wanting his own subjects used against him, the king recalled all the officers and men 
of the Anglo-Dutch brigade from their foreign service with intent to disband the auxiliary 
formation once and for all.29 At first the Dutch ignored the monarch’s plea, choosing to 
neither follow nor oppose it, unsure of how to deal with the awkward and tense situation 
that faced them. In the summer of 1688 after William had received his invitation to 
invade William the enlisted men of the brigade were forbidden from returning home.30  
The officers, by contrast, were allowed to choose which army they wished to serve. A 
few dozen (mainly Catholic) of the two-hundred and forty officers under MacKay left 
Holland to support their king. Among them was the commander of one of the English 
regiments, Colonel Alexander Cannon, who would lead the Scottish Jacobites as a 
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general at Dunkeld.31 The men who chose to leave would form the nucleus of three 
regiments James raised to prepare for invasion.32 
MacKay was unsure of what to do when faced with the impending conflict. 
Feeling duty bound towards his sovereign, he thought for some time about returning to 
Britain for the potential war.33 The general went to William’s headquarters at The Hague 
with every intention of resigning his commission, but upon hearing that plans were 
underway for the actual invasion, he reconsidered.34 Though James was MacKay’s 
nominal monarch and commander, the king’s pro-Catholic and Francophile policies were 
increasingly threatening the general’s fellow Calvinists both in Britain and on the 
Continent. Since the Restoration, the Stuart kings had been supportive of the French 
campaigns against Protestants in the Netherlands and the Rhineland. William, the rival of 
Louis XIV, the man who had been MacKay’s actual chief for over fifteen years, was now 
planning to remove that threat and secure Protestantism within Britain. MacKay, like 
nearly all of his co-religionists, let his religious ideals shape his political ones and 
declared his allegiance (and that of his troops) to the Prince of Orange just in time for the 
invasion of England. MacKay had supported been willing to support James in the early 
years of his reign, but as the Stuart king increasingly supported the Catholic interest and 
practiced more arbitrary rule, the general problem felt that James had become something 
like Louis and the French monarchy, whose service he had left nearly two decades 
before. MacKay was not alone in his feelings or his shifting of allegiance to William. As 
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military, political and religious leaders (many of the latter two groups living in exile in 
the Netherlands) flocked to William’s banner, they hoped that they could appeal to 
similar thoughts held by James’s subjects at home when the prince invaded Britain. 
 
The Campaign for the English Crown 
 William’s invasion force consisted of roughly 15,000 of some of the best soldiers 
in Europe. The Jacobites viewed William and his men as foreign invaders, but even to the 
prince himself, the troops were of foreign origin. While there were a few Dutch 
regiments, the army invading England was comprised of Danes, German Protestants, 
French Huguenots and the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.35 Although the soldiers and their 
officers did not share the same language or monarch, they, like MacKay, were staunch 
Protestants and opponents of absolutist rule. William hoped their presence in the British 
kingdoms would inspire like-minded Britons to join their cause and help him take the 
throne. 
 William’s army landed at Torbay in Devon on November 5, 1688 (a date already 
famous for the triumph of English Protestantism over Catholic machinations). Though the 
Jacobite army outnumbered the invasion forces, the king was not confident of success 
and seemed to have something of a nervous breakdown. 36 As Mark Kishlansky 
described, “Suffering from insomnia and severe nosebleeds, [James] mistakenly 
concluded that his army was too unreliable to be sent into battle.”37  Even though the 
Scotsmen of Dumbarton’s Regiment (MacKay’s first regiment), who had been recalled to 
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England by James, offered to take on the prince’s army alone, the army was ordered to 
fallback.38 The beleaguered king returned to London on November 26, where his 
situation further deteriorated. Towns throughout the realm continued to rise up in favor of 
the prince, more lieutenants defected and even his daughter, Anne, fled to the 
Williamites. Faced with increasingly unfavorable odds, James sent negotiators to 
William’s camp. 
 The representatives’ offers to call a free parliament and to pardon William and his 
followers were largely brushed aside by the prince and his entourage. Instead, the prince 
countered by offering to keep his army from London if James surrendered the city and 
called for a parliament in his name.39 Refusing to negotiate, James sent his queen and 
newborn son to France on December 10. He followed them early the next morning, 
though not before disbanding, but not disarming his armies, an act that would cause a 
serious security issue for William in the future.40  
The king headed to Kent for a boat to the Continent, but was captured shortly 
after his departure and brought back to London.  Hoping to avoid an awkward situation, 
William halted his army’s advance towards the capital, sent guards to Whitehall and gave 
James a message telling him to leave. The king headed towards Rochester, where he soon 
realized he was allowed to escape. He left England again on December 23 and would 
never return.41 
 MacKay’s religious and political convictions, as well as his strong faith in 
William had put him on the victorious side of the invasion. In a matter of weeks, the 
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Prince of Orange took the English crown for himself, but the campaign for control of the 
British thrones was far from over. After all, James was the ruler of three kingdoms and 
Ireland and Scotland both possessed large populations of Jacobite supporters that would 
certainly fight for their refugee king. In Ireland, Derry had already been claimed for the 
Williamites and was being held by a small and vastly outnumbered garrison. In January, 
the Earl of Tyrconnel, James’s Lord Lieutenant, began expanding the size of the Jacobite 
army in preparation for James’s arrival.42 The mounting tension across the Irish Sea 
became the top priority for William, who, along with his wife, would be crowned 
monarch of England on April 11. Although most of William’s attention and resources 
were poured into the Irish campaign, he could not ignore Scotland. 
 It may seem odd that Scotland does not play a major role in the narrative of the 
Revolution until after the English throne had been secured, but for both sides, the delay 
of the Scottish campaign was out of necessity. For the Williamites, England needed to be 
secured first so as to eliminate the largest military asset James had at his disposal. To 
defeat James’s English army (reinforced by men from his Scottish and Irish armies), 
William would need to concentrate all of the forces he had available, rather than scatter 
them throughout the British kingdoms. Also, once the Williamites controlled England, 
they could use it as a base from which they could more effectively conduct their 
operations in the northern realm. Likewise, the Jacobites made little effort to prepare 
Scotland for invasion since most of their military and political leaders had been called to 
England by James to help counter the invasion. Once Westminster was in full support of 
its joint monarchs, however, both sides turned their attention to the North. A group of 
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Scottish Presbyterian nobles and gentry who had come to London to show their support 
for William called for a convention parliament in the Edinburgh.43 The Convention of 
Estates, which had only been called four times since the Restoration (most recently for 
just six weeks in 1686), would have to decide the current state of the throne and officially 
declare it for one of the monarchs.44 
 While the members of the Convention debated Scotland’s political future in 
Edinburgh, the security of the realm needed to be stabilized. The King’s Scottish army 
had gone to England in response to the invasion and, like all the Jacobite forces, was 
disbanded on Salisbury Plain. Without a military force to police the kingdom, civil unrest 
was intensifying.45 As Earl Balcarres, the appointed Jacobite political leader in Scotland, 
wrote to the now deposed king, “For, so soon as the Army was past the Border, 
Edinburgh was filled with the numbers of [Presbyterians] of all Degrees, from all places 
in the Kingdom, who then though it safe to take off their masks.”46 Balcarres may have 
had fears for the stability and maintenance of order in the realm, but tended to over 
exaggerated some of his claims. Many radical Presbyterians did take to arms in the early 
stages of the Revolution, but many Scots remained loyal to James or attempted to stay 
neutral for as long as possible. 
For the radicals, the Episcopalian presence in Edinburgh (the largest in the 
Lowlands) had always been viewed as a threat. Many, however, were unsure how the 
moderates would act. Both factions of the Presbyterians had very different ideas for the 
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future of the kingdom and since many moderates had tried to appease James through his 
reign (they had, after all, benefitted somewhat from the indulgences), the radicals were 
still somewhat wary of the intentions of their fellow Presbyterians. The radicals quickly 
formed gangs, many of which were armed, and began disrupting the mail and targeting 
suspected Jacobites.47 Rival groups followed suit. If the peace was to be maintained, 
William would have to send loyal troops and raise new regiments locally. These men 
would need a leader, but William was planning on leading the effort in Ireland, so he 
would have to find someone else to lead his Scottish campaign. He turned to MacKay 
who he thought, as a native Highlander and devout Calvinist, would be better suited to 
win the hearts and minds of all of the Scottish subjects than William’s other, foreign-born 
subordinates. 
 As was the case with many of the soldiers in William’s army, a rough voyage 
across the Channel had caused MacKay’s health to deteriorate and he was slow to 
recover. His health was certainly not helped by his knowledge of the divisiveness of 
Scottish society. Though somewhat removed from  Scottish affairs, MacKay knew that 
the flight of James from Britain had opened up a power vacuum, which allowed 
Scotland’s numerous sets of adversaries to, once again, take their differences to the 
battlefield.  In the general’s case, the religious issue was of greatest importance. His time 
on the Continent had made him aware of how international Protestantism could be used 
as a unifying force, not a source of bloody conflict. When the general discovered the 
details of the situation facing his fellow Calvinists, he noted that he was, “willing to 
contribute his utmost endeavours for the advancement of so good a cause.”48  
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Unlike the Williamite army in England the small force MacKay brought with him 
was made up almost entirely of Scots, with a handful of Englishmen.49 These men were 
some of the finest in William’s service, but were predominantly Lowlanders, and thus 
unfamiliar with the Highlands and the tactics employed by its inhabitants. Thankfully for 
the general, the Convention in Edinburgh was authorized to raise more regiments, even 
some of Williamite Highlanders, which would come under the general’s command once 
he arrived in the kingdom on March 23.50 His appearance came not a moment too soon, 
as the Jacobite rebellion was about to begin. 
 
Conflicts Looms in Scotland 
 The greatest step towards war in Scotland was made on March 14 when 
Convention of Estates met in Edinburgh to determine which of the two kings would be 
their realm’s legitimate monarch. Though the idea for calling the legislature came from 
Williamite nobles, it was a fair assembly. The members were elected in their burghs after 
the Test Act, barring Presbyterians from voting, was removed.51 As a result, its ranks 
consisted of Presbyterians and Episcopalians, Jacobites and Williamites, moderates and 
radicals.52 After some initial debate, the assembly voted to support William and began to 
consider the measures to be taken for the security of the kingdom, including the 
establishment of a new army and the confirmation of MacKay as the commander-in-chief 
for the realm. 
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As the delegates met, the situation in the capital grew out of hand. Rumors 
circulated of assassination plots against Viscount Dundee and George MacKenzie, a 
staunch Jacobite and the Lord Advocate of the realm, as did reports of Jacobite plans to 
attack the Convention as a whole.53 Additionally, the Catholic Duke of Gordon, the 
governor of Edinburgh Castle, ordered the gate locked and the castle’s defenses prepared 
for a siege.54 It became apparent that Scotland could not be secured through political 
action alone. 
Fearing for his safety and being pressured by orders from James to form a 
Jacobite parliament, Dundee left the capital with fifty troopers of his old regiment who 
pledged their loyalty to James.55 They rode out of town, though not before stopping at the 
castle to discuss the necessity of holding the fortress with Gordon.56 He then spurred his 
escort onto Stirling, which unbeknownst to him, was already in Williamite hands.57 
  The following morning brought no relief to the situation in the capital and in 
response, the Convention ordered the Earl of Leven to immediately raise a regiment for 
the assembly’s protection.  The rumors of threats to the Convention and heightened sense 
of fear and tension were taken so seriously by the city’s predominantly Presbyterian 
inhabitants, that the young nobleman was able to raise eight-hundred recruits in the span 
of two hours.58 With a security force sufficient to keep the armed crowds of both factions 
at bay, the Convention’s president, the Duke of Hamilton, ordered the doors opened and 
the Convention’s members dismissed for the day, at which point many of the Jacobites 
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fled the city.59  Just a week later, the almost exclusively-Williamite Convention declared 
Dundee a rebel.60 
 This was the situation MacKay faced when he arrived in the capital city. Armed 
gangs roamed the streets, the members of the Convention were busy debating the legal 
status of the Scottish throne and who, if any, possessed it and the Jacobite leaders had 
fled to the Highlands. In early April, news came that Dundee had taken an example from 
his kinsman, James Graham, 1st Marquis of Montrose, and raised the royal standard on 
Dundee Law, thus calling the Highland clans loyal to the deposed king “to draw speedily 
to arms” and gather under his leadership.61 MacKay knew that if he gave Dundee and the 
Highlanders too much time to mobilize, his small army of Lowlanders and Englishmen 
would not be able to subdue them. He had to act quickly.  
 
The Campaign Begins 
 MacKay’s manpower shortages were alleviated to an extent by the units raised by 
the Convention, like Leven’s Edinburgh regiment. They were joined by radical 
Cameronians from the southwest of Scotland, under the command of the Earl of Angus, 
who as MacKay wrote, “sheud themselves of all the kingdom the most zealous for their 
Majesties’ government and the Protestant interest.” 62  The radical Presbyterians believed 
that the long-hated Episcopalians had finally been swayed over to the Catholic interest 
and that if they did not take to arms ever harsher repression awaited them if the Jacobites 
were successful in Scotland. 
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Although relations between the moderates and radicals were still somewhat tepid, 
largely because the exact goals of the latter were largely unknown, MacKay was willing 
to welcome the Cameronians into his ranks. These men not only came with their own 
arms and equipment, but after years of repression were more than eager to fight against 
the Highlanders and James’s other supporters. They seemed to be the exception rather 
than the rule, as MacKay noted in his memoirs that most of the regiments raised at the 
onset of the campaign had not been well supplied by the Convention and that the officers 
had been selected by the assembly’s members, “…according as they had a kindness for 
their persons or as they judged them to be popular, to get a number of men together, to 
the disorder of those troops, helping not a little…”63  
Between the regiments hastily raised by the convention and the irregular warriors 
of the Highland clans that opposed them, the armies in the Scottish theater of the 
Revolution were composed of a much smaller percentage of professional soldiers than 
those involved in the campaigns in England and Ireland. This inexperience and 
unpreparedness would somewhat handicap MacKay’s already difficult efforts, though the 
volunteer soldiers under his command would prove themselves to be of stouter heart than 
their professional counterparts. Nonetheless, the condition of MacKay’s army was far 
from ideal but the troops on hand were all that were available to meet the immediate 
Jacobite threat. 
 While the Williamites in Edinburgh were worrying about how they would train 
and equip themselves to confront the rebels, a noble from a family that traditionally 
supported the Stuart kings against the Covenanters proposed an idea that he hoped would 
prevent bloodshed. George MacKenzie, Viscount Tarbat, was described by MacKay as a 
                                                 
63
 Ibid., 7 
59 
 
man who was “not a friend, if not an enemy to the government.”64 This was not a 
surprising statement as the MacKenzies were traditional rivals of the MacKays. Tarbat, 
had been a staunch supporter of James before the Revolution and had acted as the king’s 
chief minister in Scotland. Looking to keep his political power (especially after William 
appointed Tarbat’s cousin, the Earl of Melville, Secretary of State), Tarbat pledged his 
allegiance to the Williamites and would offer political advice throughout the Revolution. 
Though he maintained some connections in the Jacobite camp, Tarbat was willing to 
advocate whatever plans could be executed that would add to his prestige prevent others 
from gaining additional favor.65 
 He was well aware that the major grievance of many of the northern clans was 
the crown’s aggrandizement of the Campbells of Argyll. Tarbat hoped that if could force 
the Highland leaders to focus on their personal rivalries, they might ignore the larger 
conflict in the kingdom, and as a result, choose not to declare for James. If the Jacobite 
army was smaller, it would be easier to defeat and if it were through his diplomatic 
efforts that the victory was made possible, William would be in the viscount’s debt. 
 To further ensure, as MacKay said, “they should not trouble their Majesties 
government,” Tarbat proposed that each chieftain be given five thousand pounds 
sterling.66 Throughout the previous half century, the Lowland political leaders never 
understood how to properly govern their Highland cousins. The people of the North had 
always been difficult to govern and were remarkably successful in the military endeavors 
against the southern Covenanters. Few in the Convention or William’s inner-circle 
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understood the Highlanders and their way or life, and so bribery seemed the easiest way 
to appease them and remove any alliances the chieftains might form with James. 
Additionally, Tarbat argued that if William tried to appease the Highland clans instead of 
subjugating them, they would be easier to rule once the war came to an end.67 
 Unfortunately for the Williamites, the Highland leaders were not as content with 
the offer. A combination of the honor of the chieftains and the fact that the Laird of 
Cawdor (“a Campbell to his name,” as MacKay described him) was sent to negotiate 
instead of Tarbat, erased any hopes the government had of success. Sir Ewan Cameron of 
Lochiel flatly ignored the representatives and Ranald MacDonnell of Glengarry refused 
the party, suggesting to Cawdor that instead of bribing the clans, he “imitate” General 
Monck and restore the proper king to the throne.68 
With the failure of the bribes, Dundee’s forces grew. MacKay understood that to 
achieve success, he would have to advance into the Highlands. The Convention’s recruits 
needed more time to train, so they were left in Edinburgh to be joined by the 
predominately English forces under Sir John Lanier, sent from England by William to 
take Edinburgh Castle. MacKay then took the veterans of his army and headed north to 
“chase Dundee.”69 John Prebble claimed that the general’s best course of action “was to 
invade the Highlands in force, establishing strong garrison and let the clans see the 
strength of the King’s power. The sooner this was done, the better…”70 
However, the officers and men in this little force were different from the armies 
sent to fight the Jacobites in the other kingdoms: they were all Britons. In the English 
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campaign, William’s predominantly foreign soldiers never fought against James’s 
Englishmen and Scots. In Ireland, the armies of both kings and the generals that led them 
were predominantly foreign-born.  With the exception of a handful of Irish Jacobites and 
MacKay’s English regulars, those involved in the Highland War were Scotsmen. 
Certainly there were veterans of the Anglo-Dutch brigade, the men in the regiments 
raised by the Convention and the warriors of the Jacobite clans had been personally 
affected by the actions of Charles and James and the turbulent events that shook the 
realm in the years leading up to the war.  
Whether they were radical Presbyterians who had repeatedly fought against the 
repression of their beliefs or poor Highlanders suffering from the economic hardships of 
the kingdom, the men MacKay and Dundee led had much more personal connections to 
the war in which they were engaged. The outcome of the Scottish campaign would 
directly impact the lives of the soldiers and their families. This created a level of 
emotional investment in the course of events not shared by the Continental mercenaries 
and auxiliaries deployed in the Revolution’s other theaters. 
 On the first day of his march, MacKay rode to the town of Dundee which was just 
less than forty miles from Edinburgh and marshaled his forces. Deciding that the city’s 
surroundings, and all of the localities in Angus for that matter, were still “very 
disaffected,” he left the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of the town to keep the peace.71 
He led the rest northward, in pursuit of the Jacobites towards Aberdeen. The majority of 
these troops he brought with him were cavalry, which Balcarres claimed was, “the only 
thing that terrifies the Highlanders.”72 Unlike the regulars MacKay’s men faced in the 
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other campaigns, the otherwise imposing Highlanders were not accustomed to cavalry, a 
difference between the two armies that MacKay would fully exploit during the course of 
the campaign. 
 As the Williamites pursued, they crossed into the lands of the Gordons, a clan 
with a history of supporting the monarchs against the Covenanters and being among the 
few in the realm who still practiced Catholicism and thus had an even stronger tie to 
James.73 Dundee wanted time to recruit the locals for his army and began conducting a 
series of feint marches, causing MacKay to order several countermarches and become 
increasingly frustrated. Within the first week of his endeavor, the general was learning 
the difficulties of conducting operations against a Highland foe. 
MacKay also learned that not all of the Highlanders were eager to support the 
Jacobites. In the northeast of Scotland, a number of clans had suffered under the political 
and economic strength of the Gordons, including Clan Forbes. Men from these families 
were more than willing to join the Williamite army and fight their rivals for control of the 
region. During the march, MacKay was approached by the Master of Forbes and roughly 
600 of his clansmen. Though the government forces could have used the reinforcements, 
the general noted the men “…were so ill armed, and appeared so little like the work that 
[I], thanking the Master for his appearance for their Majesties service, ordered him to 
dismiss those countrymen…”74 MacKay appreciated the offer, but as his army was 
already of a lower quality than what he was accustomed to, he preferred to let the untried 
levies return home. Though the Forbeses were fully prepared to engage in MacKay’s 
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military maneuvers, their willingness to serve shows just how local conflicts were 
mapped onto the larger, kingdom-wide war. 
 The Forbeses were not the first, nor the last, to become engaged in the military 
campaigns of the Highland War. While many clans had traditionally supported the Stuart 
kings and rallied around Dundee in 1689, there were some clans that chose to offer their 
support to MacKay and the greater Williamite cause. The warriors from the likes of Clans 
Grant, Ross, and, not surprisingly, MacKay were more prepared and suited for military 
endeavors that the Forbses and their arrival in MacKay’s camp helped even the odds. 
While William’s forces in the other theaters were familiar with the conventional style of 
warfare, those fighting in Scotland were at a great disadvantage against the unique 
fighting style of the Highlanders. Having some men of that region in the ranks of his 
army gave General MacKay insight into the tactics and life style of his own people. Also, 
the joining of Lowlanders and Highlanders in the Williamite ranks brought the two 
regions closer together in ways they had not often experienced previously. 
 While they helped the Williamites, long-standing quarrels also assisted Dundee in 
his efforts as they sometimes drove clans which MacKay described as “partly disaffected, 
and partly irresolute and indifferent” to his cause.75 For families like the Frasers and the 
MacKenzies, which were neutral at the war’s start, it was, quoting MacKay, “neither the 
love of King James, nor hatred of King William” that determined their allegiances.76 
MacKay and his representatives tried to woo the leadership of both clans in the earlier 
stages of the campaign, but it was to no avail. As Paul Hopkins observes, “almost the 
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only sign of MacKay’s highland origin was his clan hatred of the MacKenzies.”77 Along 
with the Sinclairs, the MacKenzies had long competed with the general’s kinsmen for 
political and economic control of the northern reaches of the Highlands.  The hatred of 
MacKay and his family and the declaration of other northern clans finally pushed the 
Frasers and MacKenzies to oppose the Williamites. As the war drew to a close, it was this 
aversion that made the MacKenzies’s chieftain, the Earl of Seaforth, reluctant to 
surrender to MacKay, even when he and his men were offered an indemnity from 
William.78 These serious regional struggles, absent in the other Williamite campaigns, did 
nothing but necessitate a complex level of diplomatic maneuvering on top of MacKay’s 
already frustrating mission and skew the general’s personal perspective of the 
campaign.79 
 More confusion was added when a chieftain’s tenants opposed his allegiance or 
when families were split between the opposing sides of the war.80 Though the latter was a 
tactic used by several clans during the civil wars of the mid-century as a way to ensure 
the family would not lose all its power and wealth as a result of the war, it was not a 
widespread phenomenon in the Highland War. The principle exception was Clan Murray. 
The political divisions within the ruling family of the clan and between its leadership and 
lower clansmen demonstrated that the factional divides in the realm were sometimes 
blurred. The differing allegiances amongst the Murrays and their tenants would prove 
frustrating to MacKay and help bring about the pivotal battle of the campaign. Whether 
fully committed against one clan or suffering from mixed allegiances, clan rivalries 
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greatly shaped the motivations for joining the conflict of Highlanders on both sides. For 
MacKay to succeed, however, he knew he would have to convince the people of the 
Highlands to put aside their enmity and embrace the idea of a unified region within a 
greater, united realm. 
 
Figure 2. The Kingdom of Scotland (Public Domain) 
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The Road to Killiecrankie 
 
 MacKay and the Williamite troops continued their pursuit of Dundee and 
Jacobites in the northern region of the Highlands.  After securing Inverness as a supply 
base, a vital necessity for any force operating in the barren Highlands, the general 
realized that the quickest way to end the rebellion would was to catch Dundee off-guard 
and destroy his army in the field. This became an increasingly difficult task as Dundee’s 
army increased significantly in strength following a gathering of the Highland clans on 
May 18. 81 The various sects of the MacDonalds came, as did the MacLeans, the Frasers 
(who had been unwilling to support MacKay at Inverness) and the Stewarts of Appin. In 
all, more than 1,500 warriors assembled.82 They would soon be joined by the men of Clan 
MacPherson, who would bring the total strength of the rebel army to roughly 3,000.83 
Now fully reinforced, Dundee headed back down the River Strathspey to Atholl, where 
he would position his army between MacKay’s army and a small column of 
reinforcements marching from Edinburgh to join the main Williamite army. 
MacKay’s force followed the enemy south on a forced march, one stretch of 
which was, as the general claimed, “a continued march of 24 hours” over rough terrain.84  
The men’s exhaustion was becoming problematic, but was far from the general’s only 
concern. He was anticipating the arrival of Williamite Highlanders from the Lairds of 
Grant and Forbes, of a better quality than what the former had previously offered, but the 
men had yet to materialize.85 More significantly, the army was beginning to experience 
the supply problems that would plague them for the remainder of the campaign. Even as 
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posts were established at places like Inverness, it was often difficult to deliver the 
necessary provisions and equipment. The unforgiving terrain, oftentimes in unfriendly 
hands, did not provide sustenance or a useful transportation network for his men and 
quartermasters, a situation that was strikingly different than that of the Williamite 
commanders in the other kingdoms. MacKay admitted that he “saw no way to secure 
himself of provisions in those rough and boggy countries.”86 The food shortages along 
with “extraordinarily cold weather” proved to be even more troublesome for the army’s 
animals.87 Lacking proper fodder, MacKay observed, “the English horses quickly lose 
their bellies and become useless many of them, and that several of them died in 
camp…”88 Though the loss of animal transport slowed his army down, MacKay’s small 
army continued in their pursuit of Dundee. 
  Conducting military operations in the Highlands, however, quickly became the 
least of the general’s worries. During the campaign, a plot was uncovered amongst some 
of the officers of the Royal Scots Dragoons, or the “Scots Greys”.89 Before the war, the 
regiment had been under the command of the Earl of Dunmore, a Jacobite sympathizer 
from Clan Murray. While Dunmore and a handful of stalwart Jacobite officers left the 
regiment rather than fight against his king, some chose to stay. In the Williamites’ haste 
to make the regiment fully-operational, the vacancies in the officer corps, including the 
post of commander, were filled with Scots from the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.90 Not 
surprisingly, this mix of allegiances would prove to be problematic. MacKay discovered 
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that a number of the regiment’s senior officers had been in communication with Dundee 
and planned to turn the entire regiment over to the Jacobites.  As if allegiances amongst 
these men were not already confused enough, a few of the conspirators decided not to 
turn on their regiment and reported the plot to MacKay. The general ordered that the 
suspected men be sent “to the Laird of Grants house of Bala Castle (where garrison was 
kept) to be kept in civil imprisonment…till he should have occasion to discover the truth 
of the matter.”91 The allegiances of the Scots were proving to be tenuous, and MacKay 
knew he could not afford to have traitors in his ranks, but the active demands of the 
campaign would need to take priority over conducting a formal trial for the conspirators. 
With the removal of the Jacobite officers, MacKay’s dragoons were composed entirely of 
staunch Williamites and could be trusted with future operations. The regiment and its 
commander, Thomas Livingston, would quickly prove to be an invaluable resource. 
 The discovery of the plot coincided with the arrival of roughly 1,000 
reinforcements from Edinburgh, both infantry and cavalry had successfully evaded the 
Jacobites and were able to join MacKay’s little army. With the general now controlling a 
numerical advantage, he forced Dundee to begin withdrawing northward once more.  
The Williamite advance guard caught up with their foe on June 7 and a sharp 
skirmish ensued. Livingston’s initial charge broke the Highlanders who, as MacKay 
described, “escaped him with the loss only of 80 or 100 men.”92 A determined 
counterattack by the Jacobites, however, prevented the troopers from following up on 
their initial success and caused Livingston to break contact.93 It was the first serious field 
engagement of the war and both sides used their supposed “victory” to boost morale. For 
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the Williamites, the skirmish was of great importance as it marked a rare occasion in 
decades of conflict that Highland warriors had been (nearly) bested on the field by their 
fellow Scotsmen. When news of the encounter reached Edinburgh, a broadside was 
published and posted throughout the city proclaiming, “the intire Defeat of the Rebbel 
Dundee by Major General Maccay.”94 Though the author falsely claimed that, “within the 
space of Three Quarters of an Hour, the Viscount with all his People was intirely 
defeated,” for the first time, the Williamite supporters in the capital and elsewhere were 
able to hear that MacKay was, “surmounting all the difficulties which the Viscount 
endeavoured to bring upon him.”95 This engagement, along with the capitulation of 
Edinburgh Castle, “brought a succession of Glad-Tydings” for the Williamites.96 Their 
efforts in England had succeeded without any setbacks and the tide of events in Ireland 
was beginning to turn in their favor. Until this engagement, the Williamites had yet to 
achieve any success in Scotland, so the leaders in Edinburgh chose to exploit the 
propaganda opportunity the skirmish presented them in an effort to raise morale and 
secure the allegiance of their supporters.  
The events in the field coincided with the transition of the Convention into the 
new Parliament, when its members officially swore allegiance to the joint monarchs. The 
pamphleteer expressed his hope that the string of Williamite successes, “[would] no 
doubt contribute to the Re-establishing the Repose of [the] Country.”97 William’s 
supporters now held the military and political momentum and support was beginning to 
swell (as exemplified by the arrival of Williamite Highlanders into MacKay’s camp) but 
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many knew that Dundee and his army were still on the march and that the campaign 
would continue. 
 
Forging Unity 
MacKay, however, was certainly pleased with the way events were unfolding and 
took care in memoirs written immediately after the war “to attribute the design, as well as 
the favorable successes therefore to God.”98 Even during the struggles of the early stages 
of the operation and in the much darker days to come, the general never lost faith and 
continued to believe that, “it pleaseth God to bless the service in our hands.”99 Although 
he and his soldiers would freely acknowledge that the Almighty “givest not always the 
Battel to the Strong…” they had no doubt that in the end, the Lord would “stir up” their 
strength and bring them victory in the war.100    
MacKay’s religious expression was common for military officers of the time 
period, but was different in the fact that it seldom promoted one particular denomination. 
Though his resignation from the French army and strong support of William indicate a 
distaste for Catholic absolutism, to this veteran of large-scale military campaigns along 
the confessional divide (as well as between Christians and Muslims), brutal fighting 
between two reformed denominations seemed irrational. In a letter to the Earl of 
Melville, the Secretary of State for Scotland, MacKay explained that he “…never thought 
to benefit [himself] therein to the prejudice of another ..” and that none in the realm 
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should.101 As he expressed in his speech before Killiecrankie, MacKay believed that 
peace could exist in the kingdom if the people of Scotland rallied together and supported 
“...their Majesties service, and the Protestant religion, for I make no essential difference 
betwixt Presbiterianisme and Episcopacy, so there being no offending supperstition, 
neither seek I any establishment or advantage in the kingdom [sic].”102 The general did 
not seem to how denominational divide had grown greatly out of proportion, but 
understand it had to be resolved for order to be restored in Scotland. The Episcopalians 
felt that their beliefs had more in common with James’s Catholicism than the Calvinism 
of the Covenanters. Like the Stuart kings themselves, prominent members of the Church 
of Scotland also believe that the Presbyterians’ ideas of church governance were a threat 
to the monarchy itself. The denominational divide was one of many problems plaguing 
the kingdom, but MacKay believed if that difference could be put aside, the realm’s other 
conflicts could be more easily resolved.  
William was the champion of Protestantism in its fight against Catholic 
absolutism. MacKay felt that the Scots needed to band together as Protestant countrymen 
to not only support William and his allies on the Continent, but bring stability to the 
kingdom and protect their realm from arbitrary rule. As he told his troops before the 
battle, the best hope for Scotland’s future was for its population to join ranks and view 
their homeland as a unified kingdom.  He hoped to persuade the Scots into believing that 
toleration and cooperation would breed unity and strength. Protestant cooperation on the 
Continent had brought great benefits for the realms of Northern Europe. If the Scots 
could look at themselves as a Protestant, rather than their particular denomination, they 
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would create one common bond upon which other sources of unity could be built. As a 
strong, stable realm, the greater Protestant community on the Continent would be much 
more accessible and Scotland could reap the benefits of new political and economic 
associations.  
The Highland War and the Glorious Revolution would finally bring about a 
lasting religious settlement and a cessation of the regional and clan conflicts in Scotland, 
but Dundee’s army had to be defeated first. 
 
The Pursuit Continues 
MacKay, believing that the Almighty was truly beginning to smile on his army, 
regrouped his forces after their encounter with their Highlanders and continued his 
pursuit of Dundee all the way to Inverness. Prior to reaching that northern city once 
again, spies reported that the Jacobite clansmen, laden with cattle, other loot and wanting 
to take care of their farms, had implored Dundee to temporarily discharge the army. 
Thus, as the general acknowledged, “the Highlanders were dispersed every one to his 
own house.”103 
MacKay took the much-needed interlude between hostilities to rest and refit his 
exhausted troops and supply convoy.104 MacKay knew that Dundee’s army would be re-
forming soon and, with reports coming in of the arrival of a few hundred Jacobite 
Irishmen, it would be of greater strength than he had previously faced. 105 The Williamite 
troops arrived back in Edinburgh on July 12 and began to refit, while the general and his 
subordinates preparing prepared their next move. 
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Back in the capital, MacKay realized that  to restore peace in the realm, his army 
would have to establish a series of garrisons throughout the Highlands, as General Monck 
had done in a half century earlier. This was especially true at Inverlochy, in Lochaber in 
the Western Highlands, the homeland of the staunchly Jacobite MacDonalds and 
Camerons.106  However, the construction and maintenance of these posts would require 
yet more troops.  The troops that had been besieging Edinburgh Castle were free to join 
MacKay’s army, as were the levies raised by the Convention throughout the spring. 
These reinforcements would finally give the general a decisive numerical advantage that 
could not be outdone by Dundee. To make the situation even more advantageous for the 
Williamite cause, the Earl of Argyll, the personal enemy of many of the Jacobite clans, 
was planning to “join a considerable number of his vassals…to form a diversion” to the 
north.107 Once MacKay had secured Inverlochy and the other posts with his main field 
army, he planned to join forces with Argyll and crush the rebels once and for all.  
The Williamite position was further strengthened on July 18 when the Privy 
Council officially declared any “…that shall joyn with…” Dundee, who had already been 
declared a rebel, and a handful of listed Jacobites, “…ought to be Pursued as declared 
Traitors to His Majesty, and his Authority and Government.”108 Although William’s 
supporters had control over Scotland’s political affairs, as long as Jacobite troops were 
still in arms, the joint monarchs’ sovereignty over the realm could not be secured. The 
new proclamation gave MacKay’s forces the justification to do whatever was necessary 
to bring an end to the Jacobite insurrection. With this approval, the necessary provisions 
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and the much-needed reinforcements, MacKay led his army towards the Highlands once 
more. 
Their march took them through Atholl, in the direction of Blair Castle, the 
ancestral home of the Marquis of Atholl and the divided Clan Murray. The Marquis, who 
had been trying to gain favor with both sides of the conflict, was away in England 
treating illness at Bath.109 He left his estates under the supervision of his son, John, Lord 
Murray, a devoted Williamite.110 The lower members of the clan, however, sided with the 
chieftain. When MacKay’s army had previously marched through Atholl, the soldiers 
tried to gather intelligence from the locals, who “magnified extremely Dundees Highland 
forces, which they affirmed, though falsely, were betwixt him and the General.”111 Lord 
Murray was not fazed by the dissension within his clan and even dismissed representative 
sent by Dundee to bring him over to the Jacobite cause. The young noble’s lack of 
concern proved to be problematic for William’s cause, as he was soon deceived by his 
father’s baillie, Patrick Stewart of Ballechin, who took control of the castle and converted 
it into a Jacobite fortress.112 As a result, in a true display of allegiance towards William, 
Murray was forced to lay siege to his own manor with as many his clansmen (whose true 
loyalty was in question) as he could find. Upon hearing of the nobleman’s predicament, 
MacKay cautiously advanced towards the siege, unsure of the true intensions of the 
Athollmen and skeptical of Lord Murray’s intentions. At first, Murray sent word to the 
general that his own men and tenants could take the back the castle, but on July 26, he 
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informed MacKay that he was forced to raise the siege at the approach of Dundee’s 
army.113 
Surprised at this news, MacKay told Murray that he would bring up his troops the 
next day. His column reached the Pass of Killiecrankie around noon and spent most of 
the afternoon navigating its narrow track.  At the sight of an imposing foe on the other 
side, the column formed its line of battle. The waiting was nerve-wracking for the men on 
both sides. While MacKay spoke to encourage his men, Dundee took time to do the same 
for his Jacobites. An anonymous broadside, published in an effort to restore Jacobite 
morale after the battle, recounted what the Jacobite viscount said, much of which 
mirrored the sentiments expressed in MacKay’s address. Dundee reminded his 
Highlanders that they were about to engage in “the Battle of your King, of your Religion 
[A protestant church ruled by Episcopalians], and of your Countrey against the Foulest 
Usurpations and Rebellions; Having so good a Cause in your hands, I doubt not but it 
will Inspire you with an equal Courage to maintain it.”114 He implored the men to, 
“Behave yourselves therefore like true Scotch-Men” and assured them, that if they were 
to fall, they “shall have the Comfort of Dying in our Duty...the Reward of a Gracious 
King and the Praise of all Good Men.”115 
The speeches given by the rival commanders illuminate the fact both sides of the 
conflict believed they were fighting for the same institutions: the crown, the country and 
religion. Just what these pillars of Scottish society meant to the opposing sides was what 
separated them. Though Dundee, like MacKay, spoke to his men about fighting for their 
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king, he was referring to a king (and his predecessors) who had repeatedly antagonized 
the divisions that had brought the realm to war. James had made his subjects toe the same 
line, but many had done so at the point of a sword.  Both sides fought for their vision of 
the kingdom and it was to that vision that the commanders spoke before the battle. 
Though the combatants on both sides had been drawn into the war largely by the rivalries 
that were intertwined within the three institutions, the goals of the two sides had changed. 
Dundee and the men to whom he appealed were fighting to restore James and secure the 
‘old’ Scotland. Their adversaries in the Williamite ranks had once viewed themselves 
simply as the rivals of the Highlanders that faced them at Killiecrankie. Thanks to their 
general, however, they were starting to be persuaded of the idea that their army did not 
simply stand for the opposite version of the old regime, but like their comrades in 
England and Ireland, were fighting for a new, modern realm where those divisions would 
be trumped by a greater sense of unity, or at least new ideas of allegiances. How the 
kingdom’s future would be defined hung on the outcome of the campaign. 
 
Defeat and Victory 
 The battle of Killiecrankie was over almost before it started. Macaulay estimated 
that, “In two minutes, the battle was lost.”116 This was certainly not the case, but portrays 
well just how bad things were for the Williamites. Around eight o’clock, Dundee ordered 
his men forward with their classic “Highland Charge.” The clansmen armed with muskets 
let loose a volley just within their maximum range, in an effort to draw the fire of the 
Williamite line, which they successfully achieved. Once the enemy cleared their muskets, 
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the Highlanders descended upon the now helpless foe, before most had time to reload. 
MacKay’s line quickly began to buckle under the impact of the imposing foe.117 
 Fearing his infantry would soon break from the melee in which they were 
engaged, MacKay ordered his cavalry forward to chase the Highlanders off the field. 
However, the troopers, for once, were fearful of the enemy warriors and “began to 
pass…and presently turned about…” from the fray.118 Seeing the cavalry run, the one 
wing of the army usually trusted to keep the clansmen in check, the Williamite infantry 
began to panic and began to flee themselves. Shaken by the chaos around him, MacKay 
thought it best to find his way to safety and attempt to rally his men. Followed by a 
servant, he “spurr’d his horse through the enemy” in order to find a spot of ground from 
which he could “see how matters stood” and make sense of the rapidly deteriorating 
situation.119 Some small pockets of resistance formed, but they did little to stop the flood 
of panic-stricken men from leaving the field. MacKay would later assert that it was only 
the Highlanders’ compulsive need to loot the Williamite baggage train that “gave time to 
many of [the] runnaways to get off.”120 
 In the brief encounter, nearly a third of MacKay’s men were killed and an equal 
number fell in the panicked retreat from the field. The casualties were especially high 
amongst the officer corps and included the commanders of two of the Anglo-Dutch 
regiments, one of whom was MacKay’s brother.121 Not only was the Williamite army 
now very weak, it was now scattered throughout Atholl. It would take serious effort on 
MacKay’s part to reunite the troops in the face of what he believed to be an unfazed 
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enemy. It would be an even more daunting task to regain the confidence of the politicians 
and the civilian Williamite supporters. 
 Unbeknownst to the general, the Jacobite army had suffered significantly in the 
battle as well. They too had lost about a third of their number, but being a considerably 
smaller force, these casualties had a greater impact. The Highlanders had also lost a large 
proportion of their leadership, including Dundee himself. Burnet wrote that near the end 
of the fighting, “a random shot put an end to his life and to the whole design.”122 The 
Highland army would stay together and others would take the commanding role, but the 
cause, like the viscount, had received a mortal wound. Much like his kinsman, Montrose, 
Dundee’s charisma and reputation was what had held the clans together and inspired 
them to fight for their deposed king and his cause. The Jacobites knew very well what 
this blow meant to their efforts, as Earl Balcarres wrote to James after receiving the news 
that, “there was none in the army who could make Use of the Victory.”123 The battle at 
Killiecrankie was the only time when William’s troops were bested in the field by those 
of James. It would prove to be a pyrrhic victory, but for the time being, the war continued 
and for the moment, the Williamites were severely shaken. 
The English Williamites had succeeded in their endeavors without any setbacks, 
while their Irish counterparts had defeated the initial Jacobite onslaught and were poised 
to launch their own offensive. The Scottish Williamites controlled so many of the other 
aspects of the campaign, but the battle was a serious impediment to the efforts. Though 
many were fearful of the immediate results, the Highland War and the Revolution in 
Scotland were far from over. MacKay and his army would soon be on the march again. 
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The News of Defeat 
 Word of the battle reached Edinburgh the next day and rumors quickly spread 
around the city. The Williamite politicians began to fear for their safety and their cause. 
The Duke of Hamilton, now the commissioner of the Parliament that had been formed 
from the Convention, reported to William’s Secretary of State, the Earl of Melville, from 
Holyrood that “the Major General was quite defeat[ed]” and that MacKay himself was 
“killed or taken by all the account we have yett got.”124 The next day, he would write 
again expressing the need for William to send his “best troops” to Scotland as quickly as 
possible since, they had “no notice of Dundies motion since the action…for if he carries 
Stirling he has all Scotland… [sic]”125 Other leading Williamites sent a flurry of 
correspondence from the capital to England and elsewhere.126 All were trying to make 
sense of the news, justify the defeat and guess just what the Jacobites would do next. The 
Williamites had yet to experience a setback of this magnitude in any of the kingdoms and 
they were unsure just how detrimental the defeat would be to their efforts. Many were 
fearful of their personal safety if the Jacobites were to march on Edinburgh, which was 
expected.  The Williamite leadership and support base was confused, uncertain and 
fearful as their situation was looking bleak. 
 While many were fearful of the Jacobite army’s intentions, still more were wary 
of the threat of subversion within the Williamite ranks. MacKay’s army had left the city 
just a few days before and had been quite confident of their chances of success. Many, 
like Sir Patrick Hume of Polwarth, an influential Member of Parliament, could only 
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believe that “the falsehood of pretended friends led honest MacKay in the snare to his 
ruin.”127 Lord Murray, whose family and levies had proved so unfaithful to the cause, 
was “exclaimed against and suspected by most…”128 Soon others would fall under 
scrutiny. As much as William’s followers were incorporating ideas of unity within their 
cause, they were extremely cautious of each other. It seemed as though some believed 
that the old rivalries had found a way to remain and flourish into the core of William’s 
support to sabotage their efforts. For the rest of the campaign in Scotland, the Williamite 
leadership would be skeptical of many and threaten severe punishments for those who 
would be willing to offer their services to the foe. 
 Some calm was restored to the capital on July 30, when MacKay’s official report 
to Hamilton, written the previous day in Stirling, arrived. In it the general described the 
battle, claiming that God had “let us see the vanity of human confidence” and harshly 
proclaimed, “that there was no regiment or troop with me, but behaved like the vilest 
cowards in nature except Hastings and my Lord Levens, whom I most praise at such a 
degree, as I cannot but blame other, of whom I expected more.”129 Though he had lost 
some of the confidence he had for his army, the general failed to name any particular 
scapegoats, probably due to the fact that he felt like most of the army had let him down. 
He also assumed, like any good commander, that the faster he could get his army turned 
back on campaign, the less chance the politicians in Edinburgh would have of 
questioning his judgment and reputation. Most importantly, MacKay believed that he 
could not allow factionalism to get the better of the Williamites. Additionally, the veteran 
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general knew that to have any hope of salvaging the situation and regaining the 
momentum, he would have to get his army back in the field and fighting again as soon as 
possible. The Williamite high command could not afford to waste its time debating who 
was to blame for the debacle. The enemy army (which to their knowledge at the time was 
still led by Dundee) was now in a position to threaten much of the kingdom and the 
progress the Williamite politicians had made. MacKay’s army needed return to the field 
quickly. 
The general reported that most of the remnants of his army had found their way to 
Stirling, where they were joined by the troops General Lanier brought up from the 
capital. MacKay seemed surprisingly confident after his reverse and was anxious for a 
chance to “chasse those highland barbarians again to their hilly confidence and 
refuge.”130 MacKay assured Hamilton that there would be no need to dissolve Parliament 
for its safety and asked only that the duke himself send word to the king, as the general 
was busy planning his renewed offensive. As long as the army was in the field, the 
politicians needed to remain doing their work in Edinburgh. If the government did not 
panic, it was hoped that the civilians would not either. Additionally, though he had been 
bested in the most recent battle, MacKay did not want displaced politicians interfering 
with his renewed military effort.  
The next day word reached the city that Dundee had been killed, news that was 
quickly dispatched to London along with MacKay’s report.131 Hamilton seems to have 
thought it best to let William read about the battle through MacKay’s own words than 
through his own analysis of the situation, the standard procedure, allowing the most 
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accurate narrative to be received. Hamilton understood that accusations and 
misinformation would only weaken their cause and would have to do what he was able to 
prevent dissension in the ranks. MacKay, as a military man, knew that he could not allow 
the enemy to exploit their success. If his army could win the next battle, the Williamites 
could regain the momentum. But he knew he would have to continue reinforcing his 
battered army with the Williamite contingents elsewhere in the country for his army to be 
ready for another battle.132 
In just a few days, the Williamite cause had received something of new life.  
Killiecrankie was, without any doubt, a crushing blow, but William’s supporters had 
made too many gains since the spring to let twenty minutes of combat end their efforts. 
The Jacobites, after all, had suffered considerable loss of life, and without Dundee, the 
movement lack an inspirational leader who could keep the Highlanders together. MacKay 
knew this weakness and understood that, for the time being, he held a significant 
advantage in strength of numbers. Though the Jacobites had been victorious, they were in 
no position to exploit their success. If MacKay acted quickly, he could take momentum 
from Jacobites and give them a setback from which they would not be able to recover. 
Just moments before Dundee’s death at Killiecrankie, all seemed to be going perfectly for 
the Jacobite cause in Scotland, but now they would be forced to pull back under the 
weight of a new Williamite assault. 
 
The War Continues 
 As news of the Jacobite victory spread, more Highlanders proclaimed for James, 
including the bulk of Murray’s clansmen. General Cannon, who had come with the Irish 
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troops sent by James, took command following Dundee’s death and decided to lead his 
army north, from what MacKay surmised, “either toward Inverness or Aberdeen.”133 This 
seemed like a sound strategy as the Northeast of Scotland was an Episcopalian (and 
therefore Jacobite) stronghold that had yet to provide all of its available manpower for the 
cause.134 The plan did not meet much success, as a result of concern over the abilities of 
the new Jacobite commanders, and only a few recruits turned out.135  
 MacKay sent his cavalry in pursuit of the Highlanders and secured Inverness and 
Aberdeen before those cities could be threatened.136  The infantry had been left 
throughout the South to keep the peace, especially amongst the troublesome Murrays in 
Atholl and Perthshire. MacKay’s operations would soon face a serious challenge, 
however, as William and his counselors at Hampton Court began to place more emphasis 
on the campaign in Ireland at the expense of MacKay’s offensive.137 With a much larger 
Jacobite army marching about virtually unchecked and personally led by James and the 
constant threat of reinforcement for their fellow Catholics in France Ireland was certainly 
the greater threat and, in terms of William’s broader European project, the greater prize. 
Just before he set sail to take command of the Williamite troops there, the Duke of 
Schomberg wrote to the King requesting that he consider “…sending troops from 
Scotland into Ireland, as by strengthening the force in the latter country, the war will be 
sooner concluded.”138 The King’s Privy Council in Edinburgh obliged and started 
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shuffling troops and officers around the various towns and garrisons in preparation for 
the departure of some from the realm.139 Amongst their decisions were the fateful orders 
for the Earl of Angus’s Cameronians to occupy the exposed town of Dunkeld.140 With the 
Highland rebels marking time in the North waiting for reinforcements, this did not seem 
like a dangerous maneuver, but the Jacobites would soon choose to retake the offensive. 
 Faced with the reality of their failed recruitment efforts and Cannon’s lack of 
ambition, the Highland chieftains insisted their commander call a council of war. While 
the Williamites were attempting (with success) to unite the various interests within their 
cause and even those who were impartial, the Jacobites were beginning to divide. Cannon 
and his fellow Irish officers were resistant to taking any sort of action, a far cry from 
Dundee’s aggressive nature, and many of the Highland leaders became outraged. 
Cannon’s Irishmen and the great chieftains came from very different social backgrounds 
and were experienced in two dissimiler styles of warfare and could not come to terms 
with each other. In protest, Cameron of Lochiel and Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat, two 
of the more influential Highlanders, headed home, leaving their men to others. All of the 
MacDonalds of Keppoch left the army’s camp and would soon take up the indemnity 
offered by the Privy Council to those willing to lay down their arms.141 
 With threats of mutiny and desertion coming to fruition, Cannon’s position 
required action. On August 17, he led his troops towards Dunkeld. The ensuing battle 
between the radical Presbyterians and Episcopalians has been described in detail above, 
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but it cannot be overstated just how devastating the defeat was to the Jacobite cause. Any 
semblance of Jacobite momentum had vanished and the Cameronians had earned the 
respect and praise of the moderate Presbyterians, with whom they had long been at odds. 
 Realizing that some of his army would soon be sent to Ireland, MacKay 
consolidated his forces and to advance again on Atholl with hope of finally subduing 
Lord Murray’s kinsmen. He hoped to make Blair Atholl a base of operations and swore 
“to leave not a house standing in Athole, and to burn and destroy all [the rebels’] corn if 
the House of Blair…should be burned by the enemy.”142 He claimed that the Athollmen 
“were the principle occasion of all the troubles and disappointments he had met with 
during the whole summer,” but still offered them “the terms of his Majestie’s gracious 
indemnity [sic].”143 Though they had been willing to cast their lot with James just a few 
weeks prior, the lesser members of Clan Murray recognized that the recent turn of events 
had made the Jacobite position untenable. As a result, MacKay reported that they 
“submitted themselves and delivered up their arms.”144 From the general’s point of view, 
this was a great step forward in achieving the objectives of the campaign. A large group 
of hostile clansmen had submitted and a large region (strategically located between 
Edinburgh and the Highlands) had been subdued. He only needed to repeat this success 
through all the Jacobite-held areas of the realm. 
 The Jacobite army had disbanded temporarily to allow the Highlanders to return 
home to tend to the meager harvests their lands provided.  MacKay took this brief 
reprieve to consider a new strategy. Instead of risking another engagement open battle in 
which the intimidating tactics of the Highlanders might defeat his troops, the general 
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decided that the most effective way to end the war would be to lead his army into one 
region at a time, forcing the Jacobites (both military and civilian) into submission and 
establishing garrisons throughout the kingdom to keep the peace. The prospect appeared 
long and tedious, causing the general to doubt his own abilities. On August 30, he wrote 
the Earl of Melville exclaiming the he was, “extremely weary of this sort of war” and that 
his post may be “more fit for a man of fewer years and more accustomed with the manner 
of this countrey, than for mee…”145 MacKay described that his belief in God and 
William’s cause were what kept him going an increasingly difficult task in the face of 
many  “inconveniences and difficultys, particularly to get the forces to subsist,…[the] 
irregular methods of the government in those things to which they have been so little 
accustomed,..[and] the skearcity of money.”146 The shortage of money and supply had  
plagued the Williamite efforts since the campaign’s beginning, but the political 
difficulties limiting MacKay’s operations were a more recent development. As military 
operations in Ireland intensified, the military resources and political attention of the 
Williamites were being increasingly focused across the Irish Sea. MacKay would be left 
to continue his campaign with what was already available to his army, though soon some 
of the few troops and supplies he had at his disposal would be transferred to support the 
operations in Ireland 
Even with political priorities and the king’s treasurybeing set elsewhere, MacKay 
was still committed to his role, as he felt obligated to protect the people of the kingdom 
from the “disorder and violence” perpetrated by the rebels.147 He hoped that he would be 
able to secure the hostile regions of the realm to such an extent that they would no longer 
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require the presence of troops to remain pacified or at least could be policed by the locals 
themselves (as was now the case in Atholl and Perthshire), thereby lessening the demands 
already put on his overstretched and overwhelmed force. 
 Any doubts the general may have had about the future of the campaign, however, 
would only be compounded in the ensuing weeks. A number of his regiments were 
finally called for service in Ireland, thus reducing the size of his army by a third.148 With 
the funds for the campaign running low, William informed MacKay that he “resolved to 
break some of the regiments paid with Scots money” and in January, three of the Scottish 
regiments under MacKay were reduced to one.149 His frustrations with the politicians 
were worsened by the fact that in protest of William’s lack of approval for their proposed 
religious settlement which would return the Presbyterian Kirk to the status of national 
church, the Scottish Parliament refused to approve the subsidies meant to fund the 
Williamite troops in the kingdom. By the winter, the coffers were empty.150 So 
aggravated was MacKay at this politicking in a time of need, he wrote to Melville saying, 
“...there is nothing but devisions and factions in Parlement, in Counsel, in the Church, 
and in the Country,” a situation that differed significantly from the greater plan MacKay 
had for the kingdom.151  As much as men like MacKay were pushing for unity, divisions 
were still very much alive within the ranks of the Williamite politicians. Many 
remembered the zealous republic that had existed in the kingdom in the years following 
the signing of the National Covenant, while debating how they could maintain the 
monarchy within limits set by Parliament. Early in their proceedings, there had even been 
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a brief discussion of the possibility of union with England, though the idea was quickly 
dropped.152 There seemed to be no doubt that the Williamites wanted the Revolution to 
create a new Scotland, but just what that meant was yet to be determined. This debate 
amongst William’s supporters would grow throughout his reign into the years preceding 
and immediately following the Union of 1707.153  For the time being, most Williamites 
understood that before any serious discussion of union with England could occur, they 
must defeat the Jacobites and consolidate their claim on the kingdom. 
 As the Highland rebels reassembled in the North, this disunion between the army, 
Edinburgh and England began to trouble MacKay who believed that, “the divisions in 
Parliament began already to raise the lost hopes of the rebels…”154 With the Williamite 
politicians more concerned with outmaneuvering each other than the enemy, the Jacobite 
army had been given a reprieve from its pursuit and had time to refit and regroup. As a 
result of his new constraints from Edinburgh and Hampton Court, and the renewed 
strength of his foe, MacKay was forced to alter his plan. Instead of placing isolated 
garrisons throughout the Highlands, which might be eliminated piecemeal, Williamite 
strongholds would be erected along the 250-mile line that divided the Highlands from the 
Lowlands. Though his forces would not be able to secure hostile areas in the Highlands, 
he hoped that it would allow his now limited army “to secure the low counties from the 
enemy’s attempts” and hopefully remove any lingering hostility between the radical and 
moderate Presbyterians.155 A far cry from the aggressive strategies MacKay had 
employed earlier, the new plan was meant to buy time while more recruits could be 
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found, or more importantly, more Williamite successes occurred in Ireland, which he 
hoped would break the will of the Scottish Jacobites. 
 For the most part, this plan failed. Throughout the winter, the Highlanders 
conducted a number of raids in an effort to acquire provisions and to overstretch the 
Williamites while creating chaos within their camps.156 Though the Williamite regiments 
and their allies attempted to retaliate, they were often force to abandon their offensive 
operations in order to protect their own territory, as was the case with a large counter-raid 
sent out from the garrison left at Inverness.157 The situation in the North had become as 
frustrating as ever for General MacKay, but as the new year began, things were not as 
splendid as they may have seemed in the Jacobite camp.  
 
The Beginning of the End 
 Even after General Cannon had arrived with his Irish soldiers prior to 
Killiecrankie, James had been promising his Highland supporters more reinforcements, 
including experienced leaders like his illegitimate son, the Duke of Berwick. In January, 
only Major General Thomas Buchan and a small cadre of officers had arrived from 
Ireland. The Jacobites felt betrayed by their king and when the Highland chieftains 
gathered to plan the next campaign, some lobbied to submit to the Williamites in 
Edinburgh.158 Though many of the Highlanders had been willing to fight for their 
deposed monarch, by this point in the campaign they began to realize that as for the 
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Williamite camp, Scotland was a low priority for the greater Jacobite efforts. The cost of 
Williamite occupation of their lands and the suppression of rebellion began to outweigh 
the willingness to wait for James’s promises to finally come into fruition. Considering the 
options, the Williamite leaders turned yet again to Tarbat and his more peaceful 
suggestions for subduing the clans. 
An indemnity was offered by the Crown to clans that submitted to William 
protected them from any repercussions of their resistance and charges of treason, all for 
the price of laying down their arms and swearing an oath to William and Mary. Many 
chieftains thought it was fair and became rather enticed by the offer. Much like the 
politicians in Edinburgh, the chieftains certainly began to consider the role they could 
play in post-war Scotland. Some like Cameron of Lochiel, who by this time had made 
amends with Cannon, were unwilling to give up and argued that the army had been too 
successful in the previous months and that the Williamite forces were growing too weak 
to warrant surrender, indemnity or not.159 In some ways, this was a sound suggestion. 
Though the army had been shaken by its reverse at Dunkeld, it still survived.160 The 
Cameronians’ victory had been largely due to the urban setting of the battle, which was 
foreign to the Highland warriors and had prevented them from using their unique tactics 
properly. MacKay had yet to best the Highlanders in a major engagement and between 
his battle losses and cutbacks in strength, the Williamite army was not the imposing 
enemy it had once been. For many, like the sexagenarian Lochiel, their motivation was 
the honor of the clans.161 All knew of the great martial deeds of their families (some, like 
Lochiel, could personally remember them) and understood that the Highland clans had 
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overcome greater odds before and never simply submitted to the Crown. Inspired by their 
memory, honor and their fiery comrades, the chieftains agreed to bring the army together 
again in March. 
 As the Jacobites planned their resurgence, MacKay was busy making his own 
plans for the upcoming campaigning season. He decided that a diversion should be made 
in the Western Highlands and Isles, the ancestral stronghold of the MacDonalds and the 
MacLeans. The general wrote that if the Williamites created “such a diversion and 
jealousy upon [the Jacobites’] coasts, that they should not much trouble the low country, 
nor be able to come out formidable enough to give us much trouble till [the Williamite 
army] could be ready to put to put to the field.”162 The general hoped that by attacking the 
homes and lands of some of the Jacobite clans, he could create a rift within their camp. 
The enemy troops would be forced to decide whether they should use their resources to 
protect the property of some of their own or continue with the operation suggested by 
others in the camp and bring the war to a new region. Though many claimed to be 
fighting for the high-minded ideal of serving their monarch, the defense of their families 
and property would be something that many of the Highlanders would not be willing to 
ignore. Knowing that the Scottish treasury was in no way able to fund such an endeavor, 
the general insisted that the government “write to the King, giving his Majesty an account 
of the general’s propositions,” in the hopes that William could provide funding from 
England for the efforts.163 As with any governmental procedures, a great deal of time 
would be required before results could be achieved. Until then, MacKay and the army 
would have to wait. 
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 In the mean time, the general decided that a change of strategy was required in the 
few remaining outposts he held in the Highlands. Following the failure of Glenlyon’s 
counter-raid in the North, MacKay ordered Colonel Livingston to take his troopers to 
Inverness and take command of the garrison in the city. Since commanders on both sides 
had commented on the effectiveness of cavalry against the Highlanders, MacKay realized 
his best chance of defeating the irregular tactics of the rebels lay in the use of the 
mounted wing of his army. Instead of relying on slow-moving columns of infantry led by 
rather inept officers, the general would ride the rebels down using his best troopers. 
 As spring dawned, Buchan and his Jacobites grew optimistic. Their series of 
incursions into Williamite territory had brought them enough food to provide for the 
army for some time and took much needed supplies away from MacKay. Since the 
Williamite position in the realm seemed rather tenuous as more and more troops were 
sent to other campaigns and their offensive stall, recruitment amongst the Jacobite-
leaning clans, had increased significantly.164 Though still feeling the effects of Dunkeld, 
some Jacobites were beginning to think that their army still had a chance for success. 
Once the weather became conducive for offensive operations, the rebel commander 
began to march his army into the North-east of Scotland. Upon learning that the Jacobites 
were on the move, MacKay ordered Livingston and a small detachment “to observe them, 
and labour…to get a catch of them, or at least to hinder the grouth of their number…”165 
After MacKay wrote that on April 27, the Williamites advanced “eight miles from 
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Inverness, upon the way towards the place where he had advertisement the enemy lay, to 
wait for further intelligence…”166 
 Livingston and his men found themselves in the lands of the pro-Williamite Laird 
of Grant, whose locally-raised regiment had a small detachment in the Williamite 
column.167 These clansmen, who Buchan thought could be swayed to the Jacobite cause, 
were more than willing to navigate Livingston through the passes and tracks leading 
towards the river and the enemy. After a night-time forced march, the Williamites found 
themselves within two miles of the enemy camp on the Haughs of Cromdale.168 In the 
early hours of May 1, Livingston met with his officers and planned the attack. At three 
o’clock, after being allowed “an half an hour to refresh both men and horse,” the 
Williamite troops were ordered forward.169 
 A troop of Livingston’s cavalry was dispatched to distract a party of Jacobites 
who were guarding a ford on the river while the rest of the troopers crossed at another 
point and rode into the camp which Buchan had scarcely tried to protect. The Jacobites 
quickly broke under the weight of the attack. Though some groups tried to mount 
resistance once they had cleared the immediate chaos of the camp, they were no match 
for the infantry reserve Livingston had brought up once contact had been made. The 
battle, with results that were quite the reverse than those of Killiecrankie, was over in 
minutes. The main Jacobite army had suffered four hundred casualties, roughly half of 
the Highlanders present in the camp, at the cost of no Williamites.170 The Jacobites who 
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were able to make it out of the ambush were totally scattered into the hills (making 
pursuit by cavalry difficult) and unable to rally themselves into any semblance of order. 
In the report he wrote to MacKay describing the battle, Livingston proclaimed, “I pray 
God the beginning of this Years Campaign may Prognosticat a blessing upon Their 
Majesties Forces, so that an end may be made of this troublesome War this Summer 
[sic].”171 Upon receiving the report, MacKay wrote that, “the news whereof did very 
much good to the King’s affairs both in Scotland and England.”172 Though the battle was 
significant, by this time the attention of the Williamites was focused on the army William 
was preparing to take to Ireland and face James’s large army in that kingdom. The 
campaign in Scotland would drag on past the summer, but it was mainly confined to 
mopping up operations. 
The Jacobites had several motivations for fighting the war but now lacked the 
means to achieve their objectives. The sovereign whose claim they sought to defend 
would be soundly defeated a few weeks later on the banks of the Boyne and forced to 
leave his kingdoms for good. The religious settlement was now solely in the hands of 
William and his politicians and seemed to be leaning ever-more closely to power of the 
majority moderate Presbyterians. In terms of the Lowland-Highland divide, both regions 
had been physically and economically damaged by the war (and it would be only Union 
with England that would restore any hope of prosperity). More importantly, the mystique 
of the Highland clans, their way of life and their art of war had been severely damaged. 
Following Dunkeld and Cromdale, the Highlanders were no longer viewed as a 
mysterious, invincible foe. The Highland warriors had been beaten and largely scattered 
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and though it would not be until they fell in the hundreds in the volley’s of Cumberland’s 
men at Culloden over a half century later,that they would finally be subdued. 
 
Finishing Moves 
 Shortly after the battle MacKay brought the rest of the army north and began 
forcing the enemy Highlanders to submit. Along the way, they encountered some 
resistance from Jacobites led by Kenneth MacKenzie, the Earl of Seaforth, who had just 
arrived from Ireland. The minor ambushes were beaten back without much difficulty and 
MacKay led his command into Inverlochy, where he intended to post a garrison on July 
3.173 Two days later, they began the construction of an outpost at the site: the aptly-
named, Fort William.174 Meanwhile, the long- anticipated coastal expedition met great 
success, forcing MacDonald of Sleat to submit to William’s authority and establish a post 
on the estate of Cameron of Lochiel.175 
 Yet MacKay was unable to oversee the fort’s construction for long, as new threats 
to the Williamite cause began emerging. Not only was fear growing of a French landing 
in England, but reports came that General Cannon had led a small portion of the reformed 
Jacobite army, along with some new recruits, into the Western Lowlands to seize 
provisions and livestock. The latter threat was forced to retreat by the mobilization of 
upwards of 14,000 Cameronians militia who were not about to have their farms ravaged 
by their Episcopalian foes as had occurred during the Covenanter rebellions.176 Cannon 
was forced to make an ignominious retreat and rejoined Buchan near Aberdeen. 
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 Sensing the time had come to break the Jacobites once and for all, MacKay 
followed in pursuit, calling on the various Williamite detachments throughout the 
Highlands to join him. Buchan and Cannon withdrew under the pressure, cutting Seaforth 
and his men off from any support.177 The Earl, who did not share MacKay’s ideals, sent 
representatives to negotiate surrender, but at the last moment (driven by his hatred of the 
MacKays), broke his word. As a result, MacKay order two hundred soldiers and nine 
hundred loyal Highlanders “to burn [the MacKenzies’s] houses and take their goods.”178 
Unwilling to capitulate to the Williamites, Seaforth disbanded his command on 
September 2. Many made their way towards the remnants of the Jacobite army, while the 
earl surrendered himself to his rival.179 
 Though Buchan and Cannon had obtained a few recruits from the staunchest of 
Jacobite clans, their army was running dangerously low on supplies. The generals 
disbanded the infantry on September 12 and gradually released their cavalrymen from 
service throughout the month. By October, serious resistance from the Jacobite army in 
Scotland had ended as they had run out of provisions and had lost the support of all but 
the fanatically loyal supporters.180 MacKay’s troops began policing the region forcing the 
Jacobite leaders to submit to William’s authority. By and large, the Jacobites submitted 
without much resistance, as many could plainly see that their attempt to restore James to 
the thrown had failed. For those who were reluctant to give in, an ultimatum would be 
issued: either the clan chieftain would take the oath by January 1, 1692 or their clans 
would no longer be eligible for a pardon. The staunchest of Jacobites gradually took the 
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king up on his offer, all save the MacDonalds of Glencoe, whose disputed missing of the 
deadline ended with tragic results.  
However, the future challenges that faced Scotland would be passed on to other 
officers, as  MacKay received orders in the fall of 1690 to return to the Netherlands for 
the winter in preparation for his next deployment.181 William’s war in Scotland may have 
been over, but his claim to the British crowns was not yet completely secured. Although 
he had been victorious at the Battle of the Boyne in July of that year, the war in Ireland 
was still underway, and it was to the Emerald Isle that the King would send his favorite 
Scottish general. 
 
Final Campaigns 
 Following the defeat at the Boyne and James’s second, and final, flight to France, 
the Jacobite army in Ireland retreated to the southern part of the island, fortified positions 
along the River Shannon and waited for the arrival of reinforcements promised by Louis. 
Since the loss of Dublin, their main stronghold became the city of Limerick, which they 
had successfully defended from an attack by the Earl of Marlborough in August of the 
previous year.182  While William’s army had been weakened by the departure of the king 
himself and some of his best units to Flanders, the Jacobites had made significant reforms 
since the disaster the previous July. Better trained units, as well as regiments and officers 
from France, made the revitalized Jacobite army an intimidating foe.183 Nonetheless, 
General Godert Ginkel, one of William’s most trusted Dutch generals, was tasked with 
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ending the war and planned to drive straight into Jacobite territory.184 One of Ginkel’s 
division commanders in the upcoming campaign would be the recently-promoted 
Lieutenant General Hugh MacKay.  
The first challenge for the Williamites was to force a crossing of the Shannon at 
the enemy-held town of Athlone. MacKay was chosen to lead the assault. With one 
powerful charge and the loss of only twelve men, MacKay broke through the Jacobite 
defenses and the enemy fled from the city.185 Just a few days later the armies would meet 
again at Aughrim. Again, Ginkel ordered his troops forward to make a frontal attack 
against a well defended position. It did not take long for the Williamites to begin to 
waver under the intense fire of the Jacobites. The battle hung in the balance until MacKay 
noticed a causeway that ran across the north side of the field that had been left 
undefended. The general ordered cavalry to follow the path and attack the enemy’s flank. 
The Williamite troopers began to roll up the Jacobite line and with the death of the enemy 
commander, the French Marquis de St. Ruth, the Williamite victory was secured at that 
pivotal moment. Following the battle, Ginkel advanced to Limerick, which was 
conquered after a brief siege. The treaty signed at the surrender, formally ended the Irish 
campaign of the Glorious Revolution, or “the War of Two Kings.” William had finally 
secured all three British kingdoms, but now required MacKay’s services elsewhere. The 
Dutch ruler had been fighting Louis on the Continent for years and now hoped to bring 
the military might of his new British subjects to bear. 
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Following another return home for the winter, MacKay joined William’s main 
army in the spring.186 He would see battle once again at Steenkirk on August 3. MacKay 
would fight his last battle leading English, Lowland Scots and Highland Scots against 
Louis, the dream William had sought to make a reality by deposing James. As at 
Augrhim, his division was ordered by his superiors to make a frontal assault against a 
superior position. This time, amidst the smoke of the gunfire, the general fell leading his 
troops. His death was mourned throughout the army and Britain.  
MacKay has largely been remembered for the rout at Killiecrankie while the rest 
of his long career has been forgotten. He may have lost that twenty-minute battle, yet he 
faced the numerous challenges and divisions that surrounded the Highland War and the 
inhabitants of Scotland and found a way to achieve his goal of securing the kingdom for 
William and Mary. Though a Scot by birth (and a Highlander at that), Scotland was a 
foreign land to him and he refused to allow himself to get caught in the infighting that 
had torn the Scots apart for decades. While rival clans, competing denominations and 
contending regions molded their long-standing struggles into the context of the Glorious 
Revolution, MacKay was able to create a possibility for unity within the kingdom that 
had not existed before. In order for the Scots to fully support William and take a proper 
place in his vision of the future Europe, they would have to abandon their old rivalries 
and mould their conflict onto the objectives of the greater Williamite Revolution. What 
P.W.J. Riley calls Scotland’s “catalogue of bloody calamities” was transformed into a 
series of developments have a lasting impact on Britain and the world.187 In the aftermath 
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of the conflict, many in Scotland began to embrace those ideas and that of a new 
kingdom, abandoning their old allegiances to region, denomination and clan. Scotland 
would endure more conflict, military, economic and social, before its modern form would 
emerge, but as a result of MacKay’s actions during the course of the Highland War and 
the Glorious Revolution, the processes that would bring about these changes were set in 
motion.
101 
Conclusion 
 
 By the time William’s orders against the MacDonalds of Glencoe were carried out 
in early 1692, the Williamite claims in the other British kingdoms had already been 
secured. The Scots had been the last to take up arms in the fight between James and 
William and were the last to once again find peace. The Scots had been, as Tim Harris 
describes, “reluctant revolutionaries.”1 In many ways, the Scots viewed the campaign for 
the crown as means to resume their armed conflicts from earlier in the century.  Clan 
supremacy, regional rivalries and the denominational struggle were of much greater 
significance to the common subject than the greater Williamite ideals of allegiance to the 
king, country and a united Protestant interest. As the conflict progressed, however, their 
opinions and motivations began to change and the Highland War became, on an 
ideological level, a principle component of the Glorious Revolution. 
 At the center of the transformation of the conflict was MacKay. While he was not 
alone in leading the greater Williamite efforts in Scotland, his professional situation made 
his approach to the conflict and ideas about Scotland were markedly different than those 
held by the other Williamite superiors. Man like Melville and Hamilton had long been 
players in the political game in Scotland. After being appointed to high positions within 
William’s Scottish government, both men looked to use political maneuverings during 
the war to retain status for themselves and their families after the war. MacKay had no 
such ambitions. His arrival in Edinburgh at the head of the Williamite army marked only 
the second time in three decades that had returned to his homeland. Though he was made 
a member of the Privy Council, he considered himself a foreigner to the realm and 
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 Tim Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London; New York, 
Penguin, 2007), 13. 
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returned to his family in the Netherlands when his service was completed. He had no 
aspirations for power or position within the realm once victory was secured and therefore, 
unlike men like Melville and Hamilton, did not allow personal political dreams impact 
his decisions during the Revolution itself. His ideological commitments to the 
Revolution’s ideals, rather than the attractions or aversion caused by old feuds, were his 
approach to soft power. While other leaders tried to push the agenda of their particular 
interest group, MacKay urged his men and the political leaders to think of themselves as 
not Lowlanders and Highlanders, but inhabitants of a unified “country”.2 Not as 
Presbyterians and Episcopalians, but as Protestants. Not as members of a particular clan 
or family, but as loyal subjects of the same king. It was certainly a daunting task, but as 
the campaign progressed, the general was able to rally Scots from various factions to one 
banner, a trend that would continue over time. By the time the Jacobite army in Scotland 
was disbanded and MacKay returned to the Netherlands, the regional rivalries had begun 
to be eclipsed by the growing sense of national unity. 
 The tradition of political and social divisiveness in the realm would reappear in 
the Scottish Parliament as the political and religious settlements were debated in the 
aftermath of the Revolution. Over the next two decades the different political opinions 
within the kingdom would also be expressed as the politicians began to consider union 
with England. Yet, even these points of contention had changed. After the Revolution, 
rivals began to face each other in the chambers of Parliament, not the battlefield. In the 
fifty years from the signing of the National Covenant to James’s flight from Britain, 
Scotland found itself engaged in two Bishops’ Wars against England, three brutal civil 
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 Hugh MacKay, Memoirs of the war carried on in Scotland and Ireland, ed. J.N. Hog et al., (Edinburgh: 
Bannatyne Club, 1823), 53. 
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wars, Glencairn’s rebellion against Cromwell, two Covenanter rebellions, Argyll’s failed 
invasion and the Highland War itself. Over the next decades, two major (in 1715 and 
1745-6) and one minor (1719) Jacobite uprisings would threaten the peace of the 
kingdom like England would never see again. But after the failure of Bonnie Prince 
Charlie, the dream of a second Stuart Restoration was over. Armed civil conflict in 
Scotland, unlike that across the Irish Sea, would not continue to the present day. The 
musketry of Cumberland’s redcoats at Culloden would end the threat of civil war in the 
realm. For those families who had long stood in support of the Jacobites (and even some 
who opposed them), the Highland Clearances followed which forced many to leave their 
homes for the Lowlands, Northern England, Nova Scotia and the American South. The 
staunch Jacobite families that had supported James and his heirs in multiple rebellions 
were never able to align themselves with the other subjects of a new, united kingdom and 
as a result, were forced to create new homes within entirely different circles of unity and 
allegiances. 
 The end of civil conflict in Scotland was not the only benefit of the Revolution. In 
many ways, MacKay’s campaign and the related political maneuverings marked a major 
turning point in the history of the kingdom and Britain as a whole. Economically 
weakened by the Revolution and its resulting commitment to William’s European 
campaigns (and a failed attempt at colonization), Scotland was forced to join with its 
southern neighbor to form a new empire. Though initially met with opposition, the Union 
quickly proved to be beneficial. Scottish merchants were able to grow rich as they 
became major participants in the trans-Atlantic trade. Many Scottish men found 
employment (as well as the honor and adventure) in the numerous Scottish regiments, 
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both Lowland and Highland, which were formed within the new, permanent British 
Army. As Britain’s empire grew, Scottish military men, politicians and adventures began 
taking leadership roles in global empire. This growth shaped the development of the 
ideals of the people of the kingdom and their views of the new communities to which 
they belonged.  
 Scotland’s experience in the Glorious Revolution differs from the experience of 
that event in the other British kingdoms in how the realm was swept into the conflict, 
how the military operations occurred and the impact it had on the future of the its people. 
Yet in the common narrative of that moment, the Scottish perspective is often 
overlooked. It lacks the “Glorious”-ness of the bloodless transition of power in England 
yet does not carry with it a long dark shadow like that which loomed over Ireland. The 
Scottish narrative is somewhere in between but yet is equally important. Scotland was 
changed forever by the events of 1688 to 1692. The kingdom and its people went into the 
Revolution as a violent, antiquated realm and emerged a modern nation soon to be part of 
a great empire. In a way, a transformation such as this was to be expected in an event we 
remember as a “revolution.” Yet, the Scots were not able to make this change on their 
own. Instead MacKay, a Scot by birth, but a product of the transformation occurring at 
the time on the Continent, took command and led Scotland from its old state to the new. 
Through his strong devotion to his faith, his leader (later, king) and the idea of a united 
nation, MacKay was able to inspire the king’s Scottish subject to begin to see the world 
in a broader context than their localized rivalries and the potential a modern Scotland. 
Those ideals were the “good cause” for which he fought and that which would forever 
change Scotland. 
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